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Vigilante violence is generally understood as an alternative means of controlling crime 
and providing security where the state does not. It has been found in nearly all modern 
societies at one point or another. Currently, in South Africa, vigilantism is common, 
accounting for roughly 5% of daily homicides. Despite its ubiquity, vigilante violence 
has largely been ignored by scholars, and in South Africa, vigilante violence tends to 
be dismissed as “mob violence.” This dissertation draws on extensive fieldwork, 
multiple qualitative and quantitative data sources, and different theoretical and 
methodological approaches, to provide a comprehensive analysis of vigilante violence 
in Gauteng, South Africa. The first paper address critical theoretical issues surrounding 




scale quantitative data from the Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2013 Quality of Life 
Survey and an independently compiled database of newspaper articles detailing 
incidents of vigilantism in Gauteng. I employ measures of perceptions of government 
performance and the provision of state security to test the relationship between 
perceived state legitimacy and vigilante violence. I find that negative perceptions of 
government performance are actually associated with decreases in vigilante violence, 
while negative perceptions of state security are associated with increases. The second 
paper utilizes the same data sources and uses the well-establish social disorganization 
ad neighborhood effects literature to examine the relationship between neighborhood 
cohesion, collective efficacy, and vigilante violence. I find that, in contrast to existing 
research, higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy actually result 
in more incidents of vigilante violence. The third paper expands upon the micro-
sociological perspective of violence developed by Collins (2008), “forward panic,” the 
process whereby the tension and fear marking most potentially violent situations is 
suddenly released, bringing about extraordinary acts of violence. Analysis of in-depth 
interviews shows that episodes of vigilante violence in townships are often clearly 
episodes of forward panic. Although the concept of forward panic focuses on 
individuals, I argue that if the pre-conditions that foster forward panics in individuals 
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On the morning of October 15th 2010, Leonard Makhubu, a resident of 
Mayibuye squatter camp in Gauteng, South Africa, noticed a potato-cutting 
machine and a sink had been stolen from his van during the night. A search for the 
missing items led Leonard and his brother to the local scrap yard, where thieves are 
commonly known to sell stolen goods. Shortly thereafter, Leonard, his brother, and 
a group of community members that had gathered during the search apprehended 
the suspect and “took the law into their own hands,” beating the suspect severely, 
until he was covered in blood. During the violence an angry member of the group 
yelled: “We’ve said enough is enough! This will teach people not to steal from 
here.” After he was beaten, the police came and took the suspect away (Daily Sun, 
10/15/10). 
 In late 2013 in Alexandra, South Africa’s oldest township, a small group of 
young men go on nightly patrols looking for the “Plasma Gang,” which has been 
terrorizing the township for months, breaking into houses, assaulting, and 
murdering residents. When the patrols find suspected Plasma Gang members, they 
sjambok1 them as punishment, get information, and then turn them over to the 
police. A local ANC official, Rhulani, described the situation in our interview: “The 
Plasma Gang ran for three months so we had to form a defense scheme. A group of 
guys would not sleep and would patrol at night because they believed that the police 
could not do more.”   
                                                 
1 A traditional cattle-whip. 
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 Around the same time, on November 4, 2013, roughly 100km from 
Alexandra, the community in the township of Khutsong went on the hunt for 
alleged “gangsters” who had been robbing, assaulting, and murdering residents. 
Thabo, who was involved in the incident, told me in an interview, “The first person 
to burn was a sangoma2 … [then] they burned two other guys who belong to the 
Casanovas … they divided into groups … some of the guys they ran away into the 
bushes. Those who were caught, they were burned.” Hours later, six men had been 
killed, five of them by necklacing, a relic of the 1980s whereby a tire is placed 
around a suspect’s neck, filled with gasoline, and set alight. Thabo’s justification 
for the violence echoes Rhulani’s almost verbatim: “The police have failed us. 
What can we do? Let us take law in our own hands.”   
 In South Africa, vigilante violence is a common response to what township3 
residents perceive as rampant and uncontrolled crime and ineffective policing. 
Indeed, many townships are marked by extreme poverty, weak infrastructure, poor 
policing, and high rates of violent crime (Baker 2008). Policing in South Africa has 
historically been unequal. Initially deliberate under apartheid’s system of racial 
subjugation and segregation, current inequalities in policing are largely the result 
of apartheid’s lasting effects and entrenched racial, economic, and infrastructural 
inequalities. Post-apartheid South Africa also struggles with widespread corruption 
                                                 
2 A traditional healer or “witch doctor,” in this case accused of aiding the gang members. 
 
3 Generally, the term “township” refers to underdeveloped communities previously 
reserved for non-Whites under apartheid. In their contemporary form, although townships 
are no longer legally designated as non-White areas, they still tend to be highly 
segregated, impoverished, and often informal areas.  
 
 3 
in the policing and criminal justice systems. Township residents commonly 
attribute vigilante violence to these problems with the police and the criminal 
justice system (Gross 2016). According to the most accurate estimates available, 
vigilante violence accounts for about 5% of all homicides in the country, which is 
equivalent to roughly two deaths a day, or about 750 deaths a year (Gould, Burger, 
and Newham 2012; SAPS 2012). Given the difficulty of accessing reliable data and 
because many incidents do not result in death, vigilante violence undoubtedly 
occurs with greater frequency than this statistic suggests.  
 
Vigilante Violence 
What is popularly known as “vigilantism” manifests in many different ways 
and has occurred in nearly all societies at one point or another (Abrahams 1998; 
Kirsch and Gratz 2010; Pratten and Sen 2008). At the most basic level, vigilantism 
is a form of informal social control relying on alternative methods of deterring 
crime in the absence of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (see 
Weber 1919). Although vigilantism remains a largely understudied area and 
academic definitions of vigilantism vary widely (see Abrahams 1998; Kirsch and 
Gratz 2010; Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974; Senechal de la Roche 1996), recent 
efforts have been made in sociology and anthropology to sharpen conceptions of 
vigilantism that encompass the wide variety of activities that might be colloquially 
considered “vigilantism” or simply “taking the law into one’s own hands,” while 
also defining it in such a way that it is analytically useful (see author forthcoming 
; Kirsch and Gratz 2010; Pratten and Sen 2008). While vigilantism can occur on an 
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individual level (i.e. interpersonal vengeance or punishment), it is typically 
understood as a group process, which is the type of vigilantism that is the focus of 
this study. Johnston (1996) provides what is now considered a classic definition of 
vigilantism as “a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force—or 
threatened force—by autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the 
transgression of institutionalized norms by individuals or groups—or to their 
potential or imputed transgression. Such acts are focused upon crime control and/or 
social control and aim to offer assurances (or “guarantees”) of security both to 
participants and to other members of a given established order” (232).  
The type of vigilantism discussed in this analysis is the most common form 
of vigilantism, “crime control vigilantism.” That is, vigilantism by private actors 
directed at “people believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal 
system. Such acts harm private persons or property, but the perpetrators escape 
justice due to governmental inefficiency, corruption, or the leniency of the system 
of due process.” (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974: 548).  
 While in their typology of vigilantism, Rosenbaum and Sederberg consider 
lynching a form of vigilantism, albeit distinct from crime control vigilantism (in 
that it is done by private actors but aimed at social group control), Senechal de la 
Roche (1996) differentiates explicitly between vigilantism and lynching as distinct 
forms of collective violence. More recent work has further distinguished lynching 
in the US context as a form of racial terrorism aimed at racial control and 
domination, rather than vigilantism. Indeed, dissimilar from crime control 
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vigilantism, many victims of lynching were never accused of any crime (Equal 
Justice Initiative 2015).  
As a result of the difficulty of obtaining reliable large-scale and quantitative 
data, research on vigilantism is typically limited to case studies and relatively small-
scale qualitative work (Gross 2016; Cooper-Knock 2014; Burr 2006; Smith 2015; 
Super 2016; Smith 2004; Harnischfeger 2003; Baker 2002; Goldstein 2003; Haas, 
Keijser, and Bruinsma 2012; Gogoy 2004). Far less research has examined 
vigilantism from larger-scale and/or quantitative perspectives, and where it has 
been done, the work has tended to focus on perceptions of vigilantism rather than 
actual participation in, and events of, vigilantism (see Nivette 2016). Ultimately, 
there is a dearth of research on vigilantism (Abrahams 1998; Senechal de la Roche 
1996; Godoy 2004; Kirsch and Gatz 2010; see Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974). 
This dissertation is thus motivated by a desire to address some of the existing gaps 
in scholarship. 
 
Vigilante Violence in South Africa 
Vigilante violence—or what is colloquially known as “mob justice” or 
“peoples’ justice,” wherein community members collectively attack a perceived 
perpetrator of crime—is widespread in South Africa and the country provides an 
ideal context in which to thoroughly analyze vigilante violence. As noted above, 
vigilante violence accounts for roughly 5% of daily homicides in the country 
(Gould, Burger, and Newham 2012; SAPS 2012) and so-called mob violence 
continues to regularly make national headlines (“Mob attacks would be Durban 
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hijackers,” eNCA,  9/15/16; “Two killed in mob justice after robberies in Walmer 
Township,” News24, 9/7/16; “Sanco slams mob justice after two men set alight,” 
News24, 7/2/16 ). Though this violence is quite common across the country, it is 
colloquially understood to be limited to South Africa’s townships.  
 Townships are characterized by dramatic racial and geographic inequalities 
in current and past infrastructural development, and lingering antagonism between 
non-white communities and the police for their violent role under apartheid. 
Consequently, many of South Africa’s townships remain vacuums of policing that 
are ripe for criminality, and vigilante violence (Bandeira and Higson-Smith 2011; 
Buur 2010). Under apartheid, the primary role of the police was to provide security 
for whites and to enforce apartheid’s racist policies (Pillay 2000). Black townships 
were “never policed in any detail from within, always at a distance, and mainly 
from without” (Hansen 2006:281). Indeed, some three-quarters of the country’s 
police stations were concentrated in white areas, leaving roughly one-quarter of the 
police force to police four-fifths of the population (Gastrow and Shaw 2001; Shaw 
2002:11). Since the end of apartheid, South Africa, like much of sub-Saharan 
Africa, has experienced rapid urbanization, particularly in the growth of informal 
settlements on the outskirts of urban areas that lack basic infrastructure such as 
roads, electricity, and water. Many of these infrastructural elements like street 
lights, telephones, or roads for police vehicles to drive are directly linked to 
effective policing, and their absence increases the likelihood of crime” (Lemanski 
2004; Singh 2005). 
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        Furthermore, as a result of the apartheid state’s violent policing of non-
whites, and in particular the brutality and harsh oppression of the police force fresh 
in the collective memory, many blacks have developed a deeply entrenched 
mistrust of the police, (Buur 2006; Lemanski 2004; Gastrow and Shaw 2001; 
Steinberg 2008). This is coupled with a widespread view of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) as incompetent. In 1996, two years after the fall of apartheid, 
only one-quarter of detectives had had any formal training and only one in ten had 
more than six years of experience serving in the SAPS (Shaw and Gastrow 2001). 
Not surprisingly, the police are often slow to respond, conduct poor detective work, 
and rarely follow-up on cases (Masiloane 2007). In fact, in 2003 it was estimated 
that only 6% of crimes resulted in conviction (Monaghan 2008:85). Community 
members also believe that the police force is riddled with corruption, which further 
compounds the existing mistrust and sense of incompetence (Gastrow and Shaw 
2001). Transparency International shows that 84% of South Africans believe the 
SAPS to be corrupt and of the 74% who had come in contact with the police, 36% 
had paid a bribe (Pillay 2013). Together these factors create a situation in which 
the police are seen as corrupt, incompetent, and historically suspect, and as a result 
are largely unwelcome in many townships. Steinberg (2008) describes the resulting 
state in which many township communities do not give “consent” to be policed by 
the state.  
        When this tenuous police-community relationship is coupled with some of 
the world’s highest crime rates (in 2012, South Africa had the 9th highest per capita 
homicide rate in the world at 30.7 and 7th highest rate of sexual violence at 127.5 
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(SAPS 2012; UNODC Statistics 2015), vigilantism becomes a more likely 
response. Indeed, a 1999 Eastern Cape survey showed that nearly half of all 
respondents and 75% of rural respondents supported alternative or traditional forms 
of justice and punishment, including vigilantism (Gastrow and Shaw 2001:261). 
More recently, nearly 80% of young South Africans said they feel that vigilante 
violence is an acceptable means of punishing alleged criminals (News24 2013). 
However, despite widespread support in public opinion and its ubiquitous nature, 
vigilante violence varies considerably across communities. Though commonly 
regarded as endemic to townships, rates of vigilante violence vary substantially 
between townships as well.  
South African vigilante violence provides a particularly salient case for 
expanding upon extant research on and theoretical frameworks of the vigilante 
violence, collective violence, social control, policing, and contentious politics in 
the Global South and elsewhere. This dissertation is an effort to not only provide a 
thorough examination of vigilante violence in South Africa, but also to critique and 
expand theory underpinning the research on these sorts of violence. The following 
analysis is presented as three distinct but interconnected papers.   
The first paper address critical theoretical issues surrounding the role of 
weak and failed states in fostering vigilantism. In this analysis, I use large-scale 
quantitative data from the Gauteng City-Region Observatory 2013 Quality of Life 
Survey and an independently compiled database of newspaper articles detailing 
incidents of vigilantism in Gauteng. I employ measures of perceptions of 
government performance and the provision of state security to test the relationship 
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between perceived state legitimacy and vigilante violence. I find that negative 
perceptions of government performance are actually associated with decreases in 
vigilante violence, while negative perceptions of state security are associated with 
increases.  
The second paper utilizes the same quantitative data sources and uses the 
well-establish social disorganization ad neighborhood effects literature to examine 
the relationship between neighborhood cohesion, collective efficacy, and vigilante 
violence. I find that, in contrast to existing research, higher levels of neighborhood 
cohesion and collective efficacy actually result in more incidents of vigilante 
violence.  
The third paper expands upon the micro-sociological perspective of 
violence developed by Collins (2008), “forward panic,” the process whereby the 
tension and fear marking most potentially violent situations is suddenly released, 
bringing about extraordinary acts of violence. Analysis of in-depth interviews 
shows that episodes of vigilante violence in townships are often clearly episodes of 
forward panic. Although the conception of forward panic focuses on individuals, I 
argue that if the pre-conditions that foster forward panics in individuals are 




Chapter 1: Perceptions of state (il)legitimacy, the provision of 
security, and vigilante violence in South Africa  
 
Abstract 
 Traditionally, scholars have argued that vigilante violence is primarily the 
product of weak or failed states and their incapacity to control crime in their 
borders. This weak/failed state hypothesis has come under scrutiny, with scholars 
instead advancing theories of the geographically unequal distribution of state 
capacities for crime control, or what have been termed “frontier zones” or “brown 
areas.” In this paper, I use large-scale survey data that is representative at the ward-
level and an independently compiled database of newspaper articles detailing 
incidents of vigilante violence in the province of Gauteng, South Africa (the 
country’s most populous province that includes the city of Johannesburg) to extend 
this body of research. I test the relationships between perceptions of state legitimacy 
and the provision of state security on incidents of vigilante violence in the South 
Africa, as well as mapping “frontier zones” or concentrations of state illegitimacy 
and incapacity. I find that while dissatisfaction with state security is associated with 
increases in vigilante violence, negative perceptions of government performance 





Traditionally, scholars have regarded vigilante violence as a product of 
weak or failed states. When states are unable to maintain their monopoly on 
violence (see Weber 1919), vigilante violence often emerges to provide social 
control, and is viewed in some cases as an almost inevitable outcome (see 
Schuberth 2013). However, other work has documented and analyzed vigilantism 
in countries like Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, England and Wales, the Netherlands, the 
United States, Nigeria, and South Africa, none of which resemble weak or failed 
states (Schuberth 2013; Nivette 2016; Goldtein 2003; Sharp, Atherton, and 
Williams 2008; Haas et al 2012; Baker 2002; Gross 2016; Jones 2008; Schaefer 
2013; Masterson 2009; Winston 2016). A great deal of this scholarship has 
challenged the weak/failed state hypothesis and instead advanced more nuanced 
approaches to understanding the relationship between the state and vigilantism. For 
instance, Nivette (2016), in her comparative study on the relationship between 
perceptions of state illegitimacy and support for vigilantism throughout Latin 
America, found that perceptions of institutional illegitimacy were indeed a robust 
predictor of support for vigilantism. Critiquing the primacy of weak or failed states, 
Nivette (2016) instead argues that support for vigilantism is associated with 
“stateless locations,” geographic areas within states in which formal justice 
structures are weak or absent. While research like this has done a great deal to 
advance our understanding of vigilantism, little research has tested the relationship 
between state illegitimacy and actual incidents of vigilante violence (Nivette 2016; 
see Wesiburd 1988).  
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Furthermore, though vigilante violence in South Africa is typically regarded 
as endemic to townships, rates of vigilante violence vary substantially between and 
within townships. This study advances the existing literature by examining the 
relationship between state illegitimacy and incidents of vigilante violence spatially. 
A great deal of the literature on institutional and state ineffectiveness and 
legitimacy and vigilantism points to “stateless locations” (Cooney 1997), “frontier 
zones” (Abrahams 1998), or “brown areas” (O’Donnell 1993), areas in which 
formal security and justice institutions are weak or absent and illegitimate forms of 
violence are present. These approaches suggest that vigilante violence is not simply 
a product of weak or failed states on the whole, but rather that the state’s 
institutional ineffectiveness is unequally distributed across the geography of its 
jurisdiction, creating areas that are vacuums of state authority and control (i.e. areas 
of state weakness or failure). That these areas often exist in “strong” states, suggests 
that the weak/failed state hypothesis itself is insufficient, albeit a useful starting 
point (Schuberth 2013). In order to explore these spatial facets of state 
weakness/failure, I extend my analysis to include the spatial distributions of state 
legitimacy, the provision of state security, and vigilante violence. As a result, we 
are able to visualize and pinpoint these areas on the edges of the power and 
authority of the state, where illegitimate forms of violence are present and as a result 
vigilantism is able and likely to emerge.  
This paper thus contributes to this body of scholarship in three key ways: 1) 
It extends the quantitative analysis of vigilantism to actual incidents of vigilante 
violence, as opposed to support for vigilantism; 2) it expands upon the weak/failed 
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state hypothesis to include the geographic unequal distribution of state authority 
and legitimacy; and 3) it maps these areas in efforts to visualize these “frontier 
zones” (Abrahams 1998). I use data from the 2013 Gauteng City-Region 
Observatory Quality of Life Survey (GCRO) and a database of newspaper articles 
on vigilante violence appearing in national, regional, and local newspapers from 
2009-2013 to accomplish this. Consistent with previous findings on this topic, I 
hypothesize that negative perceptions of state legitimacy and the provision of state 
security will be associated with increases in vigilante violence. South Africa 
provides an ideal context in which to test this relationship, as it has a long history 
of vigilantism and the country continues to experience high rates of vigilante 
violence.  
 
Weak/Failed States and Frontier Zones 
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between vigilantism and the state is often 
antagonistic. According to Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), vigilantism arises in 
situations where discontent with the government’s formal goals and achievements 
is high and “the potential for vigilantism varies positively with the intensity and 
scope of belief that a regime is ineffective in dealing with the challenges to the 
prevailing sociopolitical order” (545). More specifically, crime control vigilantism 
arises where the government is perceived to be incompetent in protecting persons 
and property. Referring back to Weber’s monopoly on violence, discontent with the 
state is high when the state claims a monopoly on violence (goal) but is unable to 
enforce it or contain violence solely within its institutions (achievement).  
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 Traditionally, this mismatch between the state’s goal of crime control and 
the provision of security and its achievement of those goals has been attributed to 
state weakness or failure. Wyler (2008) defines state weakness as “the erosion of 
state capacity — a condition characterized by gradations of a regime’s ability to 
govern effectively, which, in its most extreme form, results in the complete collapse 
of state power and function” (4). According to Rotberg (2003), weak states include 
a broad spectrum of states that are either inherently weak, due to geographical, 
physical, or fundamental economic constraints, or provisionally weak due to 
internal turmoil, corruption, or conflict (4). Failed states are weak states in their 
most extreme forms and “are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested 
bitterly by warring factions” (Rotberg 2003: 5). Failed states are marked by 
violence, intercommunity or ethnic conflict, crumbling or non-existent 
infrastructure, hostile regimes, dysfunctional political systems, and economic 
collapse (Rotberg 2003). In contrast, strong or functional states have strong and 
growing national economies, developed infrastructure, functioning and democratic 
political systems, and are members of the international community (Acemoglu 
2005).  
 Scholars of vigilantism have argued that these forms of state weakness 
and/or failure often foster vigilante violence. As states are unable or unwilling to 
control crime and violence within their borders, criminal violence grows largely 
unimpeded: “Criminal gangs take over the streets of the cities. Arms and drug 
trafficking become more common. Ordinary police forces become paralyzed… For 
protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords and other strong figures [who offer] 
 
 15 
the possibility of security at a time when all else, and the state itself, is crumbling” 
(Rotberg 2003: 6). Unsurprisingly these “strong figures” often come in the form of 
vigilante groups, or criminal groups who perform vigilante-type functions (like the 
mafias in Italy and Russia). Scholars point to a variety examples as evidence of the 
relationship between state weakness/failure and vigilante violence: vigilante groups 
in the American West in the mid-19th century (Stewart 1964; Abrahams 1998), the 
Bakassi Boys in Nigeria in the 1990s (Baker 2002; Reno 1995), People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Mapogo a Mathamanga in South Africa in 
the late 1990s into the present day, civilian security forces in Sierra Leone during 
its civil war in the 1990s (Ero 2000, Alie 2005; Jones 2008).  
Yet in most of these oft-cited examples, the states in which this vigilante 
violence takes places were not, or are not, failed states per se, albeit weak in some 
cases (with the exception of Sierra Leone). For instance, at the time the San 
Francisco Committee of Vigilance and the Montana Vigilantes were operating in 
the American West, the US was a prosperous with a relatively strong state (Weiss 
1992). In the 1990s, although experiences a great degree of violence and turmoil 
around the transition to democracy, South Africa’s economy was reasonably strong, 
especially compared to other countries in the region (World Bank 2016). Instead, it 
appears that these sorts of groups operated in distinct areas marked by eroding or 
yet-to-be established authority—geographic areas and pockets of state weakness or 
failure—in what would otherwise be characterized as strong states on the whole: 
the Western Frontier of the US, Black and Coloured townships in South Africa, the 
Anambra state in Nigeria.   
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It is clear that the weak/failed state hypothesis is insufficient in explaining 
the presence of vigilante violence. Schuberth (2013) focuses on this hypothesis 
explicitly and uses Brazil and South Africa as examples of strong states that 
experience significant levels of vigilantism. Neither Brazil nor South Africa can be 
considered weak or failed states, as they are economically strong, have highly 
developed infrastructures, functioning and democratic political systems, and are 
economically dominant in their respective regions.  
However, in otherwise functional or strong states, certain areas are still 
difficult or unable to be brought under the auspices of state authority. Schuberth 
(2013) argues that the prevalence of vigilantism in these strong and modern states 
is the result of stark polarization and inequality, which results the unequal provision 
of formal security structures whereby societal elites (generally the White upper 
class or a small but growing Black elite) reap the benefits of the strong state, and 
the Black and Brown lower classes are marginalized and intentionally neglected by 
state security structures. Geographically, the areas suffering the consequences of 
the unequal provision of security and other state goods have been referred to as 
"brown areas" (O'Donnell 1993), “stateless locations” (Cooney 1997; Nivette 2014; 
2016), or "frontier zones" (Abrahams 1998). These are areas where people “are 
largely outside the state’s legal system and hence are more likely to use aggressive 
tactics . . . to resolve their conflicts” (Cooney 1997: 393) because they cannot access 
formal and institutional methods of crime control and so “law is in essence 




Abrahams (1998) focuses explicitly on how these areas foster vigilante 
violence. He argues that state inefficiencies in securing a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence result in ‘frontier zones,’ areas on the edges of the power 
and authority of the state, where illegitimate forms of violence are present (like 
crime) and as a result vigilantism is able and likely to emerge. In many cases 
frontier zones are the physical frontiers of states, such as state borders, unsettled 
areas, or contested borderlands as in the popular examples of the American West 
in the 19th century including San Francisco and Montana (Abrahams 1996), or the 
“minutemen” on the contemporary US-Mexico border (Chavez 2008): areas where 
the “government's formal apparatus of rule enforcement has not yet effectively 
extended” (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974: 549). In many other cases, however, 
frontier zones are areas well within the geographic boundaries of the state but 
“where the state is viewed as ineffective or corrupt, and [vigilantism] often 
constitutes a criticism of the failure of state machinery to meet the felt needs of 
those who resort to it” (Abrahams 1998:9).  
Focusing on these ‘frontier zones’ maintains the key components of the 
weak/failed state hypothesis, that is state effectiveness in the provision of security 
and other goods, but is more nuanced, versatile, and refined, by incorporating the 
dimensions of inequality in the distribution of the state’s power, authority, 
monopoly on violence, and willingness to provide security and justice services. In 
locations and/or situations in which the state is proven or perceived to be unable to 
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satisfy demands for law, order, and safety, vigilantism becomes a predictable and 
even “natural,” response (Abrahams 1998:52). 
 
The Case of South Africa 
South Africa provides an ideal context in which to test the relationships between 
perceptions of state illegitimacy, the provision of security, and vigilante violence. 
Although vigilante violence is prevalent throughout the country (Gross 2016, Super 
2016, Cooper-Knock 2014, Buur and Jensen 2004), South Africa cannot 
legitimately be considered a “failed” or even a relatively “weak” state (Schuberth 
2013). South Africa has a GDP of $724 billion, placing it as the 30th strongest 
economy in the world, and is categorized as an upper middle income country by 
the World Bank (World Bank 2015). According to the Human Development Index, 
South Africa is a “Medium Human Development” country with a HDI of .666 
(substantially higher than the HDI of .518 for the region as a whole) (HDR 2015). 
South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, with 
extensive protections for human rights, and guarantees of access to basic necessities 
and services like food, water, housing, education, health care, social security, and 
safety (Klug 2004). Transparency International ranks South Africa 61st out of 167 
countries in their Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2015) 
and the Heritage Foundation ranks South Africa as a “moderately free” country 
using their Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation 2016). Even 
more specifically, the Fund for Peace ranks South Africa 113th out of 178 on their 
Index of Fragile States with a status of “low warning” (Fund for Peace 2016).  
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However, despite these characteristics indicating that South Africa is indeed 
a relatively strong state, or at the very least not a weak or failed state, South Africa 
suffers from extremely high levels of inequality on multiple dimensions. South 
Africa’s Gini coefficient, a widely used measure of inequality, is .63 for income 
distribution and .76 for wealth distribution, placing it among the most unequal 
countries in the world (World Bank 2015). Additionally, South Africa continues to 
suffer from extremely high rates of residential segregation. Although more recent 
research on the topic is unavailable, Christopher (2001) showed that in the five 
years after the fall of apartheid, in 1996, indices of segregation between Blacks and 
Whites had changed little and remained incredibly high. The country’s dissimilarity 
index declined only slightly from 91.5 in 1991 to 86.9 in 1996, an extremely high 
level of segregation by all standards (Massey and Denton 1993). The vast majority 
of South Africa’s urban population continues to live in highly segregated 
communities and the black population remains substantially isolated (Christopher 
2005; Seekings 2008; Durrheim and Dixon 2010). As Schuberth (2013) notes: “It 
is in this context of strong but unequal states that pockets of state absence evolve 
within neglected areas where the marginalized and criminalized population turns to 
alternative systems of justice and security” (42-43).   
The ubiquity of vigilantism in certain areas of South Africa is thus not 
caused solely by the state’s inability to equally meet the security needs of its all its 
citizens, but more likely by the state’s unwillingness to do so for certain areas or 
populations (Schuberth 2013). Township residents are viewed by elites as 
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“undesirable elements... who act in a 'sub-human' way” (Baker 2002: 50), and are 
thus generally denied protection from the state.  
In sum, although vigilante violence has traditionally been viewed as a 
product of weak or failed states, whereby private citizens and groups “take the law 
into their own” hands to provide security where the state cannot or will not, more 
recent scholarship has challenged this notion, arguing that vigilantism reflects not 
state capacity to provide security, but state willingness to provide security. As 
vigilante violence is found in nearly every society at one point or another, vigilante 
violence can be understood more as a product of stateless locations, brown areas, 
or frontier zones, areas in which the state does not provide adequate security 
provisions for certain citizens, typically Black, Brown, poor, or otherwise 
marginalized groups who are “deprived of formal security structures” (Schuberth 
2013: 50). The statistical analysis presented here is targeted at visualizing these 
areas, and testing the relationships between perceptions of state legitimacy, 
satisfaction with state security, and vigilante violence. 
 
Data  
Gauteng is South Africa’s smallest province geographically, accounting for 
only 1.5% of the total land area of the country, but with 13.2 million people—or 
25% of the total population of the country—it is the most populous province. 
Gauteng is home to the largest city in the country, Johannesburg, with nearly 1 
million inhabitants, and the administrative capital, Pretoria, with a population of 
about 750,000. In addition to being home to the Constitutional Court, Johannesburg 
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is the economic and financial center of South Africa and one of the largest 
economies on the continent (Parilla, Trujillo, and Berube 2015; South African 
Census 2011). Gauteng is also the most unequal province in South Africa, with a 
gini coefficient of .65 (compared to .63 nationally), which is highly unequal by 
international standards (SERO 2015; World Bank 2015).  
I use ward-level data from the 2013 Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
Quality of Life Survey (GCRO) and an independently compiled database of 
newspaper articles detailing incidents of vigilante violence in Gauteng. All of the 
data used in this analysis are at the ward-level. Local election wards were derived 
from the most recent Demarcation Board information from 2011. Wards boundaries 
are not based on population but are based on the number of seats on the municipal 
council (Municipal Demarcation Board 2016). In Gauteng there are 508 wards with 
and average population of 24,158. Detailed data from 2011 South African Census 
is also used to supplement the GCRO. 
 
Gauteng City-Region Observatory Quality of Life Survey 
The GCRO is a multi-year survey aimed at documenting and understanding 
Gauteng’s changing urban context and the quality of life of Gauteng’s residents. 
This study utilizes the 3rd phase of the survey conducted in 2013, which consists of 
a representative sample of 27,490 respondents from Gauteng’s 508 wards. 
Questions focus on quality of life indicators, living conditions, perceptions of 




 Wards were used as the primary sampling unit. In addition to ward-level 
sampling, the 2013 GCRO also sampled within wards using the Small Area Level 
(SAL) geographic units of which there are 17,840, in order to maximize population 
spread across and within wards, and the overall representativeness of the sample. 
The first stage of sampling consisted of random samples from each ward based on 
population size, with a minimum number of 30 interviews set for each ward. For 
Metropolitan Municipalities this minimum required number of interviews was set 
to 60. The second stage of sampling applied the same parameters but instead used 
the SAL as the sampling unit, which resulted in extensive coverage of population 
types within and across wards. In the end, 27,490 interviews were completed across 
all of Gauteng’s 508 wards, yielding a ward-level representative sample. The 
individual-level GCRO data were collapsed, using the weights provided by GCRO, 
to create a ward-level file containing all 508 wards. Because of the sampling 
strategy employed, this is the appropriate method of constructing ward-level 
indicators (GCRO 2014). Wards were used as proxies for neighborhoods, an 
approach that is consistent with similar neighborhood studies using census tracts or 
similar geographical units to approximate neighborhoods (Logan, Stults, and Farley 
2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Villarreal and Silva 2006). With 27,490 total 
respondents, there are an average of 54.1 responses per ward, which is a higher 
number of respondents than found in similar neighborhood studies of crime in 
Chicago neighborhoods. For example, in their analysis Raudenbush and Sampson 
(1999) have an average of 23 respondents per neighborhood cluster in their study 
of collective efficacy on crime and violence in Chicago. In their study of the effect 
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of cohesion on crime in the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte, Villarreal and Silva 
(2006) used an average of 19.1 respondents per neighborhood. 
 
Newspaper Database 
The most accurate data available on ‘public violence’ in South Africa, 
which includes vigilante violence, from the SAPS, currently does not distinguish 
between the different forms of public violence (protest, vigilantism, xenophobic 
violence, taxi violence, etc). Furthermore, crime statistics from the SAPS suffer 
from widespread underreporting (De Kock, Kriegler, and Shaw 2015). Therefore, 
determining the number of incidents of vigilante violence requires the collection of 
new data. Employing the well-established methodology of using newspaper articles 
to count collective action events (Earl et al 2004; McAdam 1999; Sampson 2013), 
I compiled a database of newspaper articles covering events of vigilante violence 
in Gauteng from 2009 through 2013 which includes counts of incidents of vigilante 
violence per ward. 
Using LexisNexis, Factiva, and the online databases of all major 
newspapers circulating in Gauteng (including City Press, The Daily Sun, The Mail 
& Guardian, Pretoria News, The Sowetan, The Star, and The Times), I employed a 
variety of search terms - “vigilante violence,” “vigilante killing,” “vigilant*,” and 
“community justice,” as well as colloquial terms such “mob violence,” “peoples’ 
justice,” and “taking the law into their/our own hands,” and additive terms derived 
from initial searches and analysis, including “residents beat”, “residents’ anger”, 
“community anger.” These search terms proved to be exhaustive, as no new articles 
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were returned before the end of the search term list was reached. In total these 
searches returned 194 unique incidents of vigilante violence from 15 separate news 
sources. The vast majority of these cases (71.6%) came from a single news source, 
The Daily Sun, which is a national tabloid newspaper that has skyrocketed in 
popularity since it was established in 2002 and is now South Africa’s most widely 
circulated newspaper with a readership of 5.6 million (Media24 2015). It is aimed 
primarily at South Africa’s black working class and township residents, a 
population that has typically been marginalized in mainstream media outlets. Many 
of the journalists are based in townships (Wasserman 2008). A noted South African 
journalism scholar, Anton Harber, has remarked that The Daily Sun has quickly 
“become an occasional must-read for anyone trying to understand this country” 
(Harber 2011). 
 Articles in the database contain varying levels of information on specific 
incidents of vigilante violence, ranging from date of the incident and a general 
location (place name, township, etc) to more details such as time of day of the 
incident, specific location details (township and extension number, street name, 
landmarks, etc), the number of alleged criminals (those attacked), a broad sense of 
the number of attackers or vigilantes (“many,” “the community,” etc), the 
motivation for the vigilante attack (robbery, assault, rape, etc), and often contain 
details about the weapons used (stones, traditional cattle whips known as sjamboks, 
etc), if the alleged criminals or vigilantes were arrested, and if anyone died or was 
burned to death. In situations where multiple articles covered the same incident, 
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information was crosschecked to the degree possible and merged to create a more 
detailed account of the incident.  
 
Dependent Variable: Incidents of Vigilante Violence 
Each unique incident of vigilante violence in the newspaper database was 
assigned GPS coordinates with the highest level of precision possible using all of 
the available information in the article. GPS center points from the South African 
2011 Census geographies for main and sub place were used wherever possible. For 
instance, for an incident that a newspaper reports to have taken place in 
Soshanguve, Block G, the Census 2011 GPS center point of Soshanguve Block G 
was assigned. If the location details only specified Soshanguve, then the Census 
2011 GPS center point of Soshanguve was used. In situations where it was not 
possible to accurately assign a center point from the Census 2011 geographies 
based on the location information in the article, manually estimated GPS points 
were assigned using Google Maps to the greatest degree of accuracy possible. 
Ward-level total counts of vigilante violence occurring between 2009 and 2013 
were then computed by overlaying these GPS center points with a GIS shapefile 
containing the 2011 ward boundaries. Thus the ward-level counts of vigilante 
violence were linked with the GCRO data.  
 
Independent Variables 
The predictor variables for this study follow previous studies examining the 
role of perceptions of state illegitimacy on vigilante violence (Nivette 2016). The 
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key predictor variable is a composite index of government performance (or state 
ineffectiveness or state legitimacy), (α =.72) that captures respondents’ perceptions 
of state ineffectiveness and satisfaction with the government. The index is 
comprised of six separate measures. These include three likert-type questions the 
level of satisfaction respondents felt toward the national, provincial, and local 
governments (1= Very satisfied, 2= Satisfied, 3=Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 
4=Dissatisfied, 5= Very dissatisfied), and a question asking which level of 
government, if any, has done the most to improve their quality of life (this question 
was coded dichotomously so that 1 = Any level of government and 0 = None of 
them). To capture perceptions of government effectiveness I included yes/no 
questions asking “In general, do you think most government officials are doing 
their best to service the people according to the principles of Batho Pele?” (Batho 
Pele means 'People First' and is an initiative to get public servants to be service 
orientated and strive for excellence in service delivery), “Your local council is 
meant to develop a plan for developing your area, called the Integrated 
Development Plan or IDP. Have you ever heard of IDPs before?”, and "Your local 
council is also meant to develop a community based plan for your area. Have you 
ever heard of the Community Based Plan?”  
An additional composite index, security ((α =.7), is included to capture 
satisfaction with, and perceptions of, state security and crime prevention. It is 
comprised of four separate indicators: 1) “During the past year, has the crime 
situation during the past year improved, stayed the same or got worse?” 
(1=improved, 2=stayed the same, 3= Got worse); 2) "Perceptions of overall safety" 
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based on how safe respondents feel during the day, at night, and at home (1 = Very 
Safe, 2 = Fairly Safe, 3 = Neither safe nor unsafe, 4 = Bit unsafe, 5 = Very Unsafe). 
3) “How satisfied are you with safety and security services provided by government 
where you live?” (1= Very satisfied, 2= Satisfied, 3=Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, 4=Dissatisfied, 5= Very dissatisfied) ; and 4) "The judiciary (courts, 
judges, etc.) is free from government influence" (1= Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = 
Neither agree nor disagree, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly disagree.) 
Additional measures were included to further examine different aspects of 
perceptions of state ineffectiveness and legitimacy. Fair election is a likert-scale 
question: "The 2014 general election will be free and fair" (1= Strongly agree, 2 = 
Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly disagree) and is 
included to indicate perceptions of the health of South Africa’s democratic process 
(a fundamental aspect of state legitimacy in democratic societies). Wrong direction 
measures whether respondents perceive the country to be going in the wrong 
direction on a likert-scale.  
Two additional indicators are included to account for “traditional” 
explanations of vigilantism that view it primarily as a product of unchecked 
criminal activity in a community. Crime problem is coded as 1 if respondents to the 
question “What is the biggest problem facing your community?” as “crime” and 0 
if they responded with something else. Crime victimization records whether 
respondents report having been the victim of a crime in the last year.  
Additional control variables that are consistent with the literature are also 
included. Concentrated disadvantage, captures concentrations of low income 
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residents and those that lack certain resources, and has been shown to impede the 
development of neighborhood cohesion and the capacity for informal social control 
(Armstrong et al 2015; Morenoff et al 2001; Sampson et al 1997). The composite 
index of concentrated disadvantage at the ward level is constructed as the first 
principal component of percent unemployed, the percent of households that have 
had to skip a meal in the last year because there was not enough money to buy food, 
and the percent of households that have ever not had enough money to feed the 
children in the household in the last year. These measure were used in place of a 
standard poverty measure as no official poverty measure exists in South Africa and 
the ability to purchase food is routinely used in the developing world as an indicator 
of poverty and food insecurity (Labadarios et al 2011). As has been the case in 
many previous studies, these variables are highly correlated thus necessitating the 
construction of this sort of index (Bruinsma et al 2013; Morenoff et al 2001; 
Sampson et al 1997).  
Socioeconomic status (α =.85) is a composite index combining the 
respondents level of education (0=None, 1=Primary only, 2=Some secondary , 3= 
Matric, 4= Post secondary or higher), how satisfied they are with the amount of 
money they have available to them personally (1= Very satisfied, 2= Satisfied, 
3=Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4=Dissatisfied, 5= Very dissatisfied), and if 





The two neighboring wards that make up the township of Diepsloot were 
combined in all the analyses below. These two wards contain the highest numbers 
of incidents of vigilante violence with 32 incidents and 14 incidents, respectively. 
Among other things, merging these two wards is important because it reduces the 
level of spatial autocorrelation to non-significant levels in the regression models. 
The new ward comprising the township of Diepsloot is an outlier with 46 incidents 
of vigilante violence over the period from 2009-2013. Thus, a dummy variable, 
Diepsloot township was included as a predictor in the regression models.4 A second 
dummy variable, township, was constructed to account for wards comprised 
primarily of townships. No clear definitions or data exist on what exactly 
constitutes a township in contemporary terms, the number of current townships in 
Gauteng, or where they are located within the province. I employ what I determined 
from my own fieldwork to be a reasonable, albeit imperfect, estimate of what 
constitutes a township given the available data. The variable township is equal to 1 
if 80% or more of the housing in a ward is comprised of informal dwellings (as 
defined by the GCRO) or Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
housing—cheap government subsidized housing common throughout South Africa 
as part of a post-apartheid program to eliminate homelessness (Lodge 2003). For 
detailed descriptions of all the variables, see Table 1.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-Level Variables 
Ward Level (N=507) Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
                                                 
4 Further tests were run excluding Diepsloot from the analysis. The results were 
consistent with those presented here.  
 
 30 
Incidents of vigilante violence .38 2.17 0 46 
     
Independent Variables     
State Legitimacy .00 .61 -1.86 1.78 
Security .00 .73 -2.24 2.35 
Fair Election 2.54 .24 1.99 3.49 
Wrong Direction 3.44 .29 2.15 4.27 
Crime Problem .29 .17 0 .78 
Crime Victimization .09 .09 0 .56 
Concentrated disadvantage .00 1.24 -2.51 4.03 
Socioeconomic Status .00 .88 -2.22 1.73 
Adult population 16545.62 9094.65 737 60178 
All townships .06 .23 0 1 
Diepsloot township 0 .04 0 1 
 
Methods 
Following previous research on rare event counts, incidents of vigilante 
violence are analyzed using negative binomial regressions. A variation of the 
ordinary Poisson model, negative binomial models account for over dispersion of 
the dependent variable. The log adult population serves as the exposure variable. 
The equation for negative binomial regression is: 
ln(λ) = 𝛽𝛽 +  𝛽1𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝛽2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 
Where λ is E(Y)/n, Y is the dependent variable, the βs are parameter estimates and 
the Xs are the structural variables in question. Coefficients are presented as 






 The findings from the exploratory spatial analysis show that, similar to 
previous research on other rare violent events like homicide (Morenoff et al. 2001), 
vigilante violence is not randomly distributed across Gauteng but is geographically 
concentrated in certain wards. As shown in Table 2, 82.6% of wards did not 
experience any incidents of vigilante violence between 2009 and 2013. Of the 
17.4% of wards that experienced at least one incident of vigilante violence, 9.3% 
experienced only one incident over the period, 5.5% had two, 1.4% had three, .8% 
had four, and .4% had five or more. Of those experiencing five or more incidents 
of vigilante violence, one ward had eight, while the ward making up the township 
of Diepsloot had 48 total incidents over the period, or nearly 10 incidents per year. 
This overdispersion of the incidents of vigilante violence justifies the use of the 
negative binomial regressions. 
 
 
Table 2.  Number of Incidents of Vigilante Violence by Ward 
# of Incidents # of wards 
0 419 (82.6) 
1 47 (9.3) 
2 28 (5.5) 
3 7 (1.4) 
4 4 (.8) 
8 1 (.2) 











While vigilante violence is clearly concentrated in certain wards, Table 2 and 
Figure 1 show that there is substantial variation in the distribution of vigilante 
violence across Gauteng. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of incidents of 
vigilante violence in Gauteng. While purely descriptive, this map clearly illustrates 
the spatial clustering of the incidents of vigilante violence. It also illustrates what 
is shown in Table 2, that the majority of the wards in Gauteng did not experience 











Figure 1. Incidents of Vigilante Violence in Gauteng from 2009-2013. 
 
 
 Figures 2 and 3 show the spatial distribution of the two key predictor 
variables, government performance and security in efforts to provide visual 
representation of the unequal geographic distribution of state legitimacy and the 
provision of security, or frontier zones. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
government performance throughout Gauteng. Wards colored darker red are areas 
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in which perceptions of government performance are low, which indicate potential 
frontier zones as defined above.  
Figure 2. Government Performance by Ward 
  
 Similarly, Figure 3 presents the spatial distribution of security, with darker 
reds representing areas in which residents are increasingly dissatisfied with the 
state’s provision of security, a key aspect of frontier zones. The variation in both 
government performance and security throughout Gauteng looks to be fairly 
substantial, although in certain areas, wards with similar levels of government 
performance and security appear to be somewhat clustered. While purely 
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descriptive, these maps advance the conceptualizations of frontier zones by 
visualizing some other their key components.   














Table 3: Incidence Rates Ratios from Negative Binomial Regressions for Government Performance and Security on Incidents of Vigilante Violence, 
2009-2013 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Government performance  .59* (.155) .49* (.137) .50* (.139) .49** (.134) .46** (.122) 
Security  2.15** (.460) 2.51** (.542) 2.18** (.559) 1.98** (.516) 1.77* (.440) 
Fair election   .18** (.102) .26* (.161) .33 (.203) .41 (.241) 
Wrong direction   3.49* (1.994) 3.49* (1.966) 3.687* (2.055) 3.8* (2.012) 
Crime problem .38 (.386) .19 (.199) .07* (.077) .17 (.208) .11 (.144) .05* (.067) 
Crime victimization 31.55* (45.630) 11.68 (17.351) 3.64 (5.383) 4.04 (5.900) 5.42 (7.886) 3.76 (5.117) 
Concentrated disadvantage    .78 (.149) .81 (.156) .85 (.154) 
Socioeconomic status    1.87* (.528) 1.71 (.486) 1.67 (.443) 
Diepsloot      45.94* (79.730) 
Township     2.17 (1.031)  
Intercept .000 (.00)** .000 (.00)** .000 (.00)** .000 (.00)** .000 (.00)** .000 (.00)** 
       
Log likelihood -341.07 -334.63 -328.16 -325.7 -324.31 -318.55 
Chi-square 6.05 18.93 31.88 36.78 39.57 51.09 
AIC 690.14 681.26 672.31 671.41 670.62 659.10 
       
N 507 507 507 507 507 507 
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 Table 3 displays the results from negative binomial regression models that 
investigate the relationship between perceptions of government performance, security, 
and the incidence of vigilante violence. Model 1 is tests a basic colloquial or “common 
sense” explanation for vigilante violence, that is, the relationship between perceptions 
of crime in one’s community, criminal victimization, and vigilante violence. While the 
coefficient for viewing crime as a problem is not statistically significant (and actually 
negatively associated with vigilante violence), the coefficient for having been a victim 
of crime in the last year is statistically significant and is very strongly associated with 
higher of incidence of vigilante violence (IRR=31.55, p < .05). These findings lend 
partial support to notion that communities suffering from higher levels of crime will 
experience more vigilantism.  
 In Model 2, I introduce the primary predictor variables, government 
performance and security. Surprisingly, government performance is negatively 
associated with incidence of vigilante violence and statistically significant (IRR=.59, p 
< .05), meaning that as respondents’ perceptions of state effectiveness and satisfaction 
with the government decrease, so does vigilante violence. This relationship is opposite 
of what existing theories of vigilantism and previous research would suggest. The 
relationship between security and incidence of vigilante violence, however, is in the 
expected direction and is also statistically significant (IRR=2.15, p < .001), meaning 
that decreases in the satisfaction with government security are associated with higher 
incidence of vigilante violence. Furthermore, the introduction of government 
performance and security, causes the coefficients for perceptions of crime in one’s 
community and criminal victimization to lose statistical significance.  
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 Model 3 introduces the additional controls fair election, a measure of if 
respondents felt that the 2014 general election would be free and fair, and wrong 
direction, which measures whether respondents perceive the country to be going in the 
wrong direction. With the introduction of these two variables into the models, the 
negative and statistically significant relationship between government performance and 
incidence of vigilante violence is strengthened (IRR=.49, p < .05), as is the positive and 
statistically significant relationship between security and vigilante violence (IRR=2.51, 
p < .001). Both fair election and wrong direction are statistically significant predictors 
of vigilante violence. Fair election is moderately negatively associated with vigilante 
violence, meaning that as perceptions that the 2014 general election would be fair and 
free decrease, so does vigilante violence. Perceptions that the country is moving in the 
wrong direction is strongly associated with increases in vigilante violence (IRR 3.49, 
p < .05). Crime problem gains statistical significance in this model, although the its 
relationship with vigilante violence is very weak. In relation to the notion that 
perceptions of state illegitimacy will increase vigilante violence, the results from Model 
3 are mixed.  
The control variables concentrated disadvantage and socioeconomic status are 
included in Model 4 to assess the role of traditional structural controls on incidence of 
vigilante violence. Socioeconomic status is significant and positively associated with 
incidence of vigilante violence.  
In order to test whether vigilante violence in South Africa is primarily, if not 
entirely, confined to townships, Model 5 introduces the township dummy as a predictor. 
Consistent with popular perceptions, townships do have a higher incidence of vigilante 
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violence than non-townships but the relationship is not significant. Furthermore, 
controlling for townships does not alter the main findings regarding the effects of the 
primary indicators. 
The township of Diepsloot accounts for 46 (24%) incidents of vigilante violence 
over the period from 2009-2013. In Model 6 the dummy variable, Diepsloot township, 
is included to control for the effect of Diepsloot on the relationship between the various 
indicators and the incidence of vigilante violence. As expected, Diepsloot has a 
significantly higher incidence of vigilante violence when other factors are controlled 
(IRR=45.94, p <.05). Despite the inclusion of the Diepsloot dummy variable, the 
statistical significance and relationship between government performance and vigilante 
violence remain the same (IRR=.46, p < .001). The positive relationship between 
security and vigilante violence is diminished only slightly, and it continues to be 
statistically significant (IRR=1.77, p <.05). The statistically significant and strongly 
positive direction of wrong direction also holds in Model 6. These results suggest that 
despite a strong positive and statistically significant relationship between Diepsloot 
township and the incidence of vigilante violence, the relationships the primary 
indicators and the incidence of vigilante violence in Gauteng is not driven by this one 
case.  
  Taken together, the results presented here offer mixed support of the hypothesis 
that negative perceptions of state legitimacy and the state provision of security will be 
associated with increases in vigilante violence. While dissatisfaction with the state 
provision of security are consistently associated with increases in vigilante violence, as 
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expected, perceptions of government performance are consistently negatively 
associated with vigilante violence.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The descriptive results from this paper, namely the mapping of some of the key 
components of frontier zones, is a step forward in understanding these concepts more 
empirically, and visualizing some of the key distinctions between weak and failed 
states, and the uneven geographic distribution of state legitimacy and security. Future 
work can build upon this to more critically analyze the idea that these geographic 
inequalities are not in fact a matter of state weakness, but societal polarizations and 
policies that ultimately allow for the state to neglect certain areas or populations in 
terms of security and governance at the expense of some groups and to the benefit of 
others. 
While the regression results presented here offer mixed support for the main 
hypothesis, there are a number of important conclusions and implications that can be 
drawn in regards to the study of vigilante violence. The fact that crime victimization 
and viewing crime as the number one problem in your community were not reliable 
indicators increases in vigilante violence suggests that there are a lot of other factors 
influencing vigilante activity. Crime and perceptions of crime alone are not a sufficient 
driver of vigilantism.   
It is clear from the regression analysis that discontent with the state’s provision 
of security is an important predictor of vigilante violence. This is consistent with 
theories of vigilante violence that suggest that it arises when the state cannot or does 
 
 42 
not provide adequate security for its citizens. It also supports the conceptions of frontier 
zones and the idea that there are geographic inequalities in the provision of state 
security that give way to vigilante violence.  
 The finding that negative perceptions of government performance were 
associated with decreases with vigilante violence, while contradictory to what would 
be expected based on the literature, perhaps sheds light on how private citizens might 
require some base level of perceived state or institutional support to engage in high risk 
informal social control. Drakulich and Crutchfield (2013) argue that informal social 
control is more likely to occur in more affluent neighborhoods and where faith in 
institutions of state security is high. This is in part because residents see the benefits of 
participation in informal social control as outweighing the costs. Where police are 
perceived to be willing to support and engage with informal social control efforts, the 
costs for participation are reduced via reducing the perceived risk of retaliation or 
further victimization. The benefits are also increased through increased effectiveness 
of the informal social control activity via police support. So while dissatisfaction with 
the state security might increase vigilante activity, it might be that residents require at 
least some level of perceived government performance to engage in these high risk 
activities. If residents feel that they cannot adequately rely on any level of government 
(not just security structures), they may perceive the risks of participation in vigilante 
violence as outweighing the potential benefits.    
This complicated relationship between state legitimacy, the provision of 
security, and vigilante violence also bring up some important questions in regards to 
contentious politics. While vigilante violence can clearly be conceptualized as a 
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reaction to the state’s unwillingness or inability to provide security in certain areas or 
for certain populations, it might also be conceptualized as a contentious political 
response that antagonizes the state, (further) calls into question its legitimacy, and 
makes claims on the state in regards to how certain communities understand the state’s 
role in policing. For instance, in South Africa, it has been suggested that vigilante 
violence offers direct challenge to the state’s increasingly human rights based approach 
to justice (Smith 2015). Whereby those engaged in vigilante violence believe 
“criminals are afforded too many rights by the state – rights which perpetuate insecurity 
and upend justice by allowing criminals to go unpunished” (Smith 2015: 345). 
Vigilante violence thus “challeng[es] the basic terms on which the state protect[s] its 
citizens by attacking the strong legal rights afforded to suspected criminals” (Smith 






Chapter 2: Neighborhood cohesion, collective efficacy, and 
vigilante violence in South Africa  
 
Abstract 
 While the role of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy in reducing 
crime and violence is understood to be a result of a community’s capacity to engage in 
informal social control, this body of research assumes informal social control to be non-
violent. This assumption may hold in settings where communities have access to 
institutional avenues and supports through which they can translate cohesion into non-
violent informal social control. However, in contexts in which those institutional 
avenues are absent or inaccessible, the capacity for informal social control that 
neighborhood cohesion generates may be the capacity for violent informal social 
control. In this paper, I examine the effects of neighborhood cohesion and collective 
efficacy on incidents of vigilante violence in the South African province of Gauteng, 
the country’s most populous province that includes the city of Johannesburg. I use 
large-scale survey data that is representative at the ward-level and an independently 
compiled database of newspaper articles detailing incidents of vigilante violence in 
Gauteng. I find that higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy 
result in more incidents of vigilante violence, even when controlling for concentrated 





A large body of research has indicated the importance of community 
organization, and particularly cohesion among local residents, in explaining variations 
in levels of crime and violence in communities. However, this research focuses 
exclusively on violent crime such as assault, intimate partner violence, and homicide 
(Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson et al. 1997). No work to the 
author’s knowledge has examined the role of neighborhood cohesion on collective 
forms of violence, such as political violence, protest violence, civil war, terrorism, or 
vigilante violence.5 Vigilante violence should be of particular interest to scholars of 
neighborhood cohesion. A core assumption underlying much of the research on this 
topic is that higher levels of neighborhood cohesion yield less crime and violence via 
residents’ ability to enforce social norms through non-violent informal social control. 
By definition, vigilante violence is a violent form of informal social control by which 
community members can enforce social norms (Johnston 1996), and possibly a violent 
manifestation of neighborhood cohesion. 
Further motivating this work is the fact that little empirical research on the role 
of cohesion on violence and crime has been conducted outside of the US (Bruinsma et 
al. 2013). While the relationship between cohesion, crime, and violence has been tested 
outside of the US context (for example see Bruinsma, et al.  2013; Eisner and Wikström 
1999; Mazerolle et al. 2010; Pauwels et al. 2010; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson 
                                                 
5 While a number of scholars have focused on various forms of cohesion, namely group 
cohesion, and these forms of violence (for examples see Bakke, Gallagher, and Seymour 
2012; Pearlman 2014; Staniland 2014), no research to the author’s knowledge have focused 
explicitly on the relationship between neighborhood cohesion and these violent outcomes.  
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and Wikström 2008; Steenbeek and Hipp 2011; Wikström 1991; Wikström and 
Dolmén 2001), the vast majority of studies have been conducted only in Western 
contexts, thus calling into question the generalizability of their findings (Armstrong et 
al. 2010). South Africa provides an ideal context to examine these relationships because 
vigilante violence and “community justice” have a long and storied history in the 
country, beginning in the early 20th century, and are typically at the forefront of 
discussions around South Africa’s high rate of violent crime (Bandeira and Higson-
Smith 2011; Sekhonyane and Louw 2002).  
 Using vigilante violence as the outcome variable, this paper tests the 
relationship between neighborhood cohesion and vigilante violence in Gauteng, South 
Africa, the country’s most populous province, which includes the largest city in the 
country, Johannesburg, as well as the administrative capital, Pretoria. I use data from 
the 2013 Gauteng City-Region Observatory Quality of Life Survey (GCRO) and a 
database of newspaper articles on vigilante violence appearing in national, regional, 
and local newspapers from 2009-2013. This study departs from previous research on 
neighborhood cohesion by focusing on vigilante violence, a form of informal social 
control, rather than crime as the outcome measure. 
 
Neighborhood Cohesion, Collective Efficacy, and Informal Social Control 
 A central thread within the broad research on neighborhood cohesion has 
focused in particular on crime and violence (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson 2013; 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Villarreal & Silva 2006). Existing theories 
emphasize the role that community characteristics like poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, 
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and residential mobility play in impeding the creation and utility of social ties among 
residents (Shaw and McKay 1942). When and where communities lack social ties, 
residents’ ability and willingness to engage in collective social control actions 
addressing problems in their community is limited, thus making criminal activity more 
possible. Scholars argue that neighborhood cohesion reduces violence through 
residents’ ability and willingness to intervene for the common good via informal social 
control and is a “critical means by which urban neighborhoods inhibit the occurrence 
of personal violence” (Sampson et al. 1997: 919). Overall the level of neighborhood 
cohesion has been found to be an important predictor of the rate of crime and violence 
in various urban settings (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Drakulich & Crutchfield 2013; 
Janowitz 1975; Kornhauser 1978; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson et al. 1997; 
Shaw and McKay 1942).  
 In their now classic work, Sampson et al. (1997) elaborate on the theories of 
neighborhood cohesion and argue that neighborhood cohesion alone is not enough for 
residents to engage in informal social control to reduce violence. Instead, they 
underscore the importance of ‘collective efficacy,’ or “neighborhood cohesion among 
neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” 
(Sampson et al. 1997: 918). Using data from the Project on Human Development in 
Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN), they find that collective efficacy is negatively 
associated with violence in communities and mediates the association between 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability in determining levels of crime. 
Further research focusing on collective efficacy has found similar relationships 
between collective efficacy and violence (Morenoff et al. 2001). 
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However, a fundamental assumption in this body of literature is that these 
informal social control interventions are non-violent. Since the cohesion literature 
points to a lack of community capacity to engage in informal social control as being 
conducive to higher levels of crime and violence, it is wholly unclear where vigilante 
violence, a violent form of informal social control, fits in this framework. Focusing 
explicitly on vigilante violence forces us to reconsider the established theories of 
neighborhood cohesion and violence. Because vigilante violence may be more likely 
to occur in neighborhoods characterized by stronger ties among community residents, 
violence (in the form of vigilantism) may actually be more common in neighborhoods 
with higher levels of neighborhood cohesion or collective efficacy. Contradicting the 
established literature on cohesion, collective efficacy, and violence, I hypothesize that 
higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy will result in more 
incidents of vigilante violence. Existing theories suggest that higher levels of cohesion 
reduce crime directly and indirectly through informal social control activities. Since 
vigilantism is a form of informal social control, higher levels of cohesion could lead to 
a greater community capacity to engage in violent informal social control.  
 
Informal Social Control and Vigilante Violence 
 Weak social ties among neighborhood residents limits their ability and 
willingness to engage in informal social control activities, such as identifying common 
problems (like crime, violence, and/or disorder) and acting collectively for the common 
good (Drakulich & Crutchfield 2013; Sampson et al. 1997). While Sampson et al. 
(1997) and others have found a strong negative association between collective efficacy 
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and violence, Kingston et al. (2009) found that in Denver, willingness to intervene 
(based on measures similar to those used by Sampson et al.) was not associated with 
levels of property or violent crime but neighborhood cohesion lowered levels of 
property offending. Using a modified measure of Sampson et al.’s collective efficacy 
in Georgia and Iowa, Simons et al. (2005) found that collective efficacy was negatively 
associated with delinquency. Together this body of research demonstrates that 
communities with strong social ties and cohesion have lower levels of crime and 
violence, yet the variability across settings underscores the need to further test these 
concepts in new contexts. Moreover, these studies focus exclusively on common crime 
and ignore a host of other criminal and violent outcomes. Vigilante violence in 
particular—though illegal—is a mechanism of informal social control by which 
communities enforce social norms and attempt to control criminal violence.     
Informal social control generally refers to the ability of a group to recognize 
common problems and act collectively to address them. Drakulich and Crutchfield 
(2013) argue that informal social control is more likely to occur in more affluent 
neighborhoods, neighborhoods with a higher degree of residential stability, and where 
trust in the police is high. This is in part because residents see the benefits of 
participation in informal social control as outweighing the costs. Where police are 
perceived to be willing to support and engage with informal social control efforts, the 
costs for participation are reduced via reducing the perceived risk of retaliation or 
further victimization.  The benefits are also increased through increased effectiveness 
of the informal social control activity via police support. Following these findings, the 
capacity for informal social control in South African townships may be expected to be 
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low, as these communities are typically marked by high poverty, racial segregation and 
isolation, low perceptions of police efficacy, and very high levels of distrust in police 
(author forthcoming; Baker 2008). If lack of faith in the police in particular “inhibits 
informal social control activities, and in fact explains lower capacities for informal 
social control in minority communities” (Drakulich and Crutchfield 2013:403), why 
then do we see such a high prevalence of informal social control, in the form of 
vigilante violence, in many townships?  
Although it is generally accepted that neighborhood cohesion increases the 
capacity for informal social control and the role it plays in reducing crime, less research 
has examined the dynamics of that resulting social control (Bursik 1999). Attempts to 
explicate how neighborhood cohesion and informal social control make areas less 
conducive to crime focus solely on non-violent forms of informal social control. As 
Drakulich and Crutchfield (2013) argue, participation in informal social control is 
predicated on a participant’s assessment of the potential risks and benefits. The backing 
of formal social controls (like the police) makes participation in informal social control 
more appealing by making it less risky and more beneficial. If the backing of formal 
social controls is weak, the participation is made less likely by “increase[ing] perceived 
vulnerabilities to [the] potential costs associated with participating in informal social 
control” (Drakulich & Crutchfield 2013: 385).  
Fundamental within this body of literature is the assumption that residents of 
cohesive neighborhoods are actually able to translate that cohesion into informal social 
control, typically through accessing institutional means of formal social control, like 
the police and court systems. Based on his work in disadvantaged areas of Chicago, 
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Wilson (1996) suggests that although many poor neighborhoods are actually 
characterized by strong networks, those networks do not result in the production of 
social control (pp. 63-64). It is entirely possible that despite high levels of 
neighborhood cohesion, poor communities lack the resources and institutional capacity 
to translate cohesion into social control (Hunter 1985). Thus, while higher levels of 
neighborhood cohesion increase the likelihood that community members are willing to 
respond collectively to a perceived problem (crime, for instance), if that community 
also lacks the resources to channel their actions through legal and/or legitimate avenues 
(like the police or criminal justice system), it is possible that the collective action could 
take on illegal and violent means. Just as in poor urban communities in the US, it is 
possible that South African townships are characterized by strong networks but lack 
the resources and institutional capacity that facilitate the link between cohesion and 
non-violent informal social control. Violent informal social control such as vigilante 
violence, on the other hand, typically does not rely on any institutional backing. Indeed, 
it is predicated in the absence of institutional grounding (which may explain why 
vigilante violence does not occur more frequently in poor urban communities in the 
US).  
 While the relationship between neighborhood cohesion, collective efficacy, 
crime, and violence is understood to be a result of a community’s capacity and ability 
to exert informal social control, this body of literature assumes informal social control 
to be non-violent. Though this assumption may hold in contexts in which communities 
have access to institutional avenues and supports through which they can translate 
cohesion into non-violent informal social control, in contexts in which those 
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institutional avenues and supports do not exist or are not accessible, it is entirely 
possible that the capacity for informal social control that neighborhood cohesion 
generates will be the capacity for violent informal social control. In the rest of the paper, 
I test the hypothesis that in South Africa, higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and 
collective efficacy will result in more incidents of vigilante violence. 
 
Data 
 See Chapter 1, Data and Methods section: Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
Quality of Life Survey, Newspaper Database, Dependent Variable: Incidents of 
Vigilante Violence, Additional Controls.  
Independent Variables 
 The predictor variables for this study are based in previous studies examining 
the role of cohesion and violence at the neighborhood level (Morenoff et al. 2001; 
Sampson et al. 1997; Villarreal & Silva 2006). The primary predictive variable is an 
index of neighborhood cohesion (α =.86) that captures the level of individual and 
household participation in local civic activities and organizations in the last year. This 
index is comprised of 15 separate measures including individual and household 
participation in ward meetings, street committee or resident’s association meetings, 
community development forum meetings, Mayoral imbizo meetings (open meetings 
between communities and local politicians), Integrated Development Plan meetings, 
school governing body meetings, community policing forum meetings, and community 
and social groups including neighborhood watches, political parties, student 
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organizations, street or block committees, tribal or clan associations, or any other non-
governmental or community based organizations.    
 An additional measure of trust is used as a separate predictor because it was 
found to be more weakly related to the other items included in the index neighborhood 
cohesion. Including this measure reduced Cronbach’s alpha to .69 from .86. The 
measure of trust is based on the question in the GCRO survey asking respondents: 
“Generally speaking, do you think that most people in your community can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people in your community?” 
Those answering “Most people can be trusted” to the question were coded as 1, those 
answering “you need to be very careful” were coded as 0. While trust is used as a 
separate indicator from neighborhood cohesion, an additional index of collective 
efficacy consistent with the existing literature was also constructed. Collective efficacy 
is typically defined as the “linkage of trust and cohesion with shared expectations for 
control” (Morenoff et al. 2001: 520). Thus an index of collective efficacy was 
constructed by combing neighborhood cohesion and trust.  
 Additional control variables that are consistent with the literature are also 
included. Concentrated disadvantage, captures concentrations of low income residents 
and those that lack certain resources, and has been shown to impede the development 
of neighborhood cohesion and the capacity for informal social control (Armstrong et 
al. 2015; Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997). The composite index of 
concentrated disadvantage at the ward level is constructed as the first principal 
component of percent unemployed, the percent of households that have had to skip a 
meal in the last year because there was not enough money to buy food, and the percent 
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of households that have ever not had enough money to feed the children in the 
household in the last year. These measure were used in place of a standard poverty 
measure as no official poverty measure exists in South Africa and the ability to 
purchase food is routinely used in the developing world as an indicator of poverty and 
food insecurity (Labadarios et al. 2011). As has been the case in many previous studies, 
these variables are highly correlated thus necessitating the construction of a composite 
index (Bruinsma et al. 2013; Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997).  
 Residential stability, in the form of high levels of home ownership and low 
levels of residential mobility, has been posited to increase levels of cohesion and 
informal social control, as longer-term and more stable residents are thought to be more 
invested in the well-being of their community (Sampson et al. 1997). The percentage 
of owner-occupied housing is used as a measure of residential stability. This includes 
those who either own and have paid off their houses and those who are currently paying 
off their houses. The percent foreign-born is used as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity, 
which has been posited to decrease the development of neighborhood cohesion. In 
South Africa, outbreaks of xenophobic violence have occurred in recent years, notably 
in May of 2008 when 62 people were killed. Many similar but smaller episodes of 
xenophobic violence have occurred since, most recently in January 2015 (Pattel and 
Essa 2015). Perceptions of policing efficacy have been shown to be positively 
associated with informal social control (Drakulich & Crutchfield 2013). To account for 
the effect of perceptions of police efficacy on vigilante violence, I introduce perception 
of safety as a predictor in the regression models. Since a direct indicator of perceptions 
of policing efficacy is not available in the data, perception of safety is used as a proxy. 
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This variable is derived from the likert-style question “How safe do you feel at home?”: 
1 = “Very Safe,” 2 = “Fairly Safe,” 3 = “Neither safe nor unsafe,” 4 = “Bit unsafe,” 5 
= “Very Unsafe.” South Africa, and in particular Johannesburg, has been noted for its 
“fortress” mentality, with high, thick concrete walls, electric fencing, barred windows 
and doors, and home security systems which are commonplace for those who can afford 
them as protection from the outside community or intruders into the community 
(Landman and Schonteich 2002; Lipman and Harris 1999). Thus, feelings of safety at 
home was chosen as the measurement for how vulnerable people feel in their 
communities. For variable descriptions see Table 4.  
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood-Level Variables 
Ward Level (N=507) Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
Incidents of vigilante 
violence 
.38 2.17 0 46 
     
Independent Variables     
Neighborhood cohesion .00 .94 -1.98 2.17 
Trust .2 .13 0 .73 
Collective efficacy .00 .079 -2.4 1.73 
Concentrated 
disadvantage 
.00 1.24 -2.51 4.03 
Percent home ownership .29 .17 0 .78 
Percent foreign-born .09 .09 0 .56 
Perception of safety 2.01 .32 1.15 3.06 
Adult population 16545.62 9094.65 737 60178 
Township .06 .23 0 1 
Diepsloot township 0 .04 0 1 
 
Methods 
 The first set of models test the relationship between neighborhood cohesion and 
trust and the incidence of vigilante violence in Gauteng. In the second set, collective 
efficacy is used as the primary predictor. Following previous research on rare event 
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counts, incidents of vigilante violence are analyzed using negative binomial 
regressions. A variation of the ordinary Poisson model, negative binomial models 
account for over dispersion of the dependent variable.6 The log adult population of the 
ward serves as the exposure variable. The equation for negative binomial regression is: 
ln(λ) = 𝛽𝛽 +  𝛽1𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝛽2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 
Where λ is E(Y)/n, Y is the dependent variable, the βs are parameter estimates and the 
Xs are the structural variables in question. Coefficients are presented as incidence rates 
ratios in all of the tables below.   
 
Results 
Descriptive Results  
The findings from the exploratory spatial analysis show that, similar to previous 
research on other rare violent events like homicide (Morenoff et al. 2001), vigilante 
violence is not randomly distributed across Gauteng but is geographically concentrated 
in certain wards. As shown in Table 2 (Chapter 1), 82.6% of wards did not experience 
any incidents of vigilante violence between 2009 and 2013. Of the 17.4% of wards that 
experienced at least one incident of vigilante violence, 9.3% experienced only one 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, statistical routines for testing negative binomial regressions that account for 
spatial autocorrelation are not currently available. In order to examine whether the estimates 
of the models presented in Tables 3 and 4 are biased due to spatial correlation, I examined the 
spatial correlation of the error terms by estimating Moran's I for the residuals of the full 
models (Table 3, Model 5 and Table 4, Model 5). Moran's I measures the degree of linear 
correlation between a variable at a given location and the weighted average of that variable at 
neighboring locations and is typically used as a diagnostic tool (Chi and Zhu 2008). Once the 
two neighboring wards that constitute the township of Diepsloot were merged, values for 
Moran's I were very low and not statistically significant (-.01, p > .05 for both of the full 




incident over the period, 5.5% had two, 1.4% had three, .8% had four, and .4% had five 
or more. Of those experiencing five or more incidents of vigilante violence, one ward 
had eight, while the ward making up the township of Diepsloot had 48 total incidents 
over the period, or nearly 10 incidents per year. This overdispersion of the incidents of 
vigilante violence justifies the use of the negative binomial regressions. 
While vigilante violence is clearly concentrated in certain wards, Table 2 and 
Figure 1 (Chapter 1) show that there is substantial variation in the distribution of 
vigilante violence across Gauteng. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of incidents 
of vigilante violence in Gauteng. While purely descriptive, this map clearly illustrates 
the spatial clustering of the incidents of vigilante violence. It also illustrates what is 
shown in Table 1, that the majority of the wards in Gauteng did not experience any 
incidents of vigilante violence between 2009 and 2013. Figures 4 and 5 show the 
distribution of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy by ward, respectively. 
Unsurprisingly, areas that have high concentrations of neighborhood cohesion also 
have high concentrations of collective efficacy. The variation in both neighborhood 
cohesion and collective efficacy throughout Gauteng is fairly substantial, although in 
certain areas, wards with similar levels of neighborhood cohesion and collective 
efficacy appear to be somewhat clustered. 
 










Table 5 displays the results from the negative binomial regression models that 
investigate the relationship between neighborhood cohesion, trust, and the incidence 
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of vigilante violence. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes only neighborhood 
cohesion and trust as the predictors. From this model we see that neighborhood 
cohesion is statistically significant and is associated with a higher of incidence of 
vigilante violence (IRR=1.9, p < .001). These findings diverge from the results of 
studies showing that community cohesion reduces crime and violence within 
communities in other national contexts. Rather than preventing violence, neighborhood 




Table 5.  Incidence Rates Ratios from Negative Binomial Regressions for Neighborhood Cohesion and 
Trust on Incidents of Vigilante Violence, 2009-2013 


















































































      
Log Likelihood -334.44 -333.37 -326.81 -318.17 -323.02 
Chi squared 19.31 21.44 34.56 51.85 42.16 
AIC 676.88 680.75 669.63 654.34 664.03 




Model 2 introduces the traditional structural controls discussed in the previous 
section, including concentrated disadvantage, percent home ownership, and percent 
foreign-born. Greater neighborhood cohesion continues to be associated with 
significantly higher incidence of vigilante violence despite the addition of these 
controls (IRR=1.9, p < .001). While concentrated disadvantage is associated with a 
higher incidence of vigilante violence when neighborhood cohesion and trust are not 
included in the model (results not shown), when they are included the coefficient for 
concentrated disadvantage loses statistical significance. This suggests that the level of 
neighborhood cohesion and trust in disadvantaged neighborhoods accounts for their 
higher incidence of vigilante violence. Furthermore, neither the percentage of 
homeowners nor the percentage of foreign-born residents is associated with greater 
levels of vigilante violence. This is in some ways consistent with the literature on 
cohesion which argues that the pathways through which these structural characteristics 
influence crime and violence is through disrupting the formation and functioning of 
social ties and networks. Trust was also negatively associated with vigilante violence 
but was not significant (IRR=.72, p > .05). This finding challenges the research that 
emphasizes trust as a predictor of a community’s capacity for informal social control, 
and its subsequent role in reducing crime and violence. In the case of vigilante violence, 
as opposed to ordinary crime, trust among community members does not appear to 
significantly affect their ability to engage in informal social control. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that higher levels of neighborhood cohesion actually result in 
more incidents of vigilante violence in Gauteng net of all other factors.  
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 Model 3 introduces perceptions of safety as a proxy for policing efficacy. As 
noted earlier, vigilante violence may at least be in part the result of residents feeling 
unsafe or unprotected by the police. When they feel unsafe, residents may be more 
likely to engage in vigilante violence in an attempt to provide for their own safety. 
However, in Model 3, perceptions of safety is not a significant predictor (although 
positive) of incidence vigilante violence. Despite the introduction of perceptions of 
safety, the relationship between neighborhood cohesion and incidence of vigilante 
violence changes little, and it remains a significant and positive predictor. However, 
the introduction of perceptions of safety results in a significant and strongly positive 
relationship between percent of owner occupied homes and the incidence of vigilante 
violence (IRR=5.39, p < .05). This finding is particularly interesting as theories of 
cohesion would predict that increases in home ownership would decrease the level of 
violence in a community, as has been found elsewhere (Sampson et al. 1997). However, 
as vigilante violence is distinct from criminal violence and a form of informal social 
control, it is less surprising that the direction of the relationship would be the opposite 
of what would be assumed elsewhere. That is, as homeowners are thought to be more 
actively invested in the well-being of their communities and may therefore more readily 
engage in informal social control. In the South African context such informal social 
control appears to often take on a violent form.  
 The township of Diepsloot accounts for 46 (24%) incidents of vigilante violence 
over the period from 2009-2013. In Model 4 the dummy variable, Diepsloot township, 
is included to control for the effect of Diepsloot on the relationship between the various 
structural indicators and the incidence of vigilante violence. As expected, Diepsloot 
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has a significantly higher incidence of vigilante violence when other factors are 
controlled (IRR=79.94, p <.001). While introducing Diepsloot township, results in 
percent of owner occupied homes becoming non-significant—neighborhood cohesion 
remains statistical significance and the magnitude of the relationship between it and 
vigilante violence is reduced only slightly. This suggests that despite a strong positive 
and statistically significant relationship between Diepsloot township and the incidence 
of vigilante violence, the relationship between the level of neighborhood cohesion and 
the incidence of vigilante violence in Gauteng is not driven by this one case. Indeed, 
when Diepsloot is excluded from the analysis altogether the results are consistent with 
those presented here. 
 In order to test whether vigilante violence in South Africa is primarily, if not 
entirely, confined to townships, Model 5 introduces the township dummy as a predictor. 
Consistent with popular perceptions, townships indeed have a higher incidence of 
vigilante violence than non-townships. However, controlling for townships does not 
alter the main findings regarding the effect of neighborhood cohesion.  
Collective efficacy is introduced in Table 6 as the primary predictor, replacing 
the separate indicators of neighborhood cohesion and trust and making the models 
more comparable to those used by scholars examining violent crime (Sampson et al. 
1997; Morenoff et al. 2001). In Model 1 we see that by itself, collective efficacy is both 
statistically significant and associated with increases in vigilante violence (IRR=2.14, 
p < .001). Indeed, across Models 1 through 4, collective efficacy is found to be a 
consistent and statistically significant positive predictor of vigilante violence. 
Diverging from the results of studies showing that collective efficacy reduces crime 
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and violence within communities, as collective efficacy in a neighborhood increases, 
the incidence of vigilante violence also increases. Only in Model 5, with the 
introduction of the township control, does collective efficacy become non-significant 
(although the direction and magnitude remain generally the same).  
Diverging from the bulk of existing research that shows that cohesion and 
collective efficacy generally mitigate violence in communities, the results from Tables 
5 and 6 demonstrate that in South Africa greater levels of neighborhood cohesion and 




Table 6.  Incidence Rates Ratios from Negative Binomial Regressions for Collective Efficacy on 
Incidents of Vigilante Violence, 2009-2013 











































































      
Log Likelihood -335.7 -334.53 -330.4 -321.36 -325.96 
Chi squared 16.8 19.13 27.39 45.47 36.28 
AIC 677.39 681.06 674.8 658.72 667.91 
N 507 507 507 507 507 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings presented here support the main hypothesis that in South Africa, 
higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy will result in higher 
incidents of vigilante violence, net of all other factors. These findings suggest that 
cohesion and collective efficacy operate differently in South Africa than has been 
theorized in Western contexts. While neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy 
certainly encourage informal social control in South Africa, it is informal social control 
that manifests as collective violence against alleged criminals, rather than the non-
violent informal social control activities that are typically considered in this body of 
research.      
These findings provide three critical challenges to the established sociological 
literature on neighborhood cohesion, collective efficacy, and violence which finds that 
higher levels of cohesion and collective efficacy reduce the level of violence in a 
community. First, this literature has focused solely on criminal violence, namely 
assault, intimate partner violence, and homicide, ignoring a host of other salient forms 
of violence that communities experience, in particular forms of collective violence, like 
political violence, protest violence, civil war, terrorism, and vigilante violence. Second, 
the literature has largely argued that informal social control is the mechanism by which 
neighborhood cohesion translates into lower levels of crime and violence, has 
employed a limited view of informal social control, assuming that informal social 
control is non-violent. While this may be true in contexts in which communities have 
access to institutional avenues and supports through which they can translate cohesion 
into non-violent informal social control, this is certainly not universally the case, 
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particularly in marginalized communities. It has been argued throughout this paper that 
vigilante violence, a violent form of informal social control, complicates theories of the 
role of neighborhood cohesion and informal social control in determining levels of 
violence and crime, as it is at once criminal, violent, and a form of informal social 
control explicitly aimed at deterring and punishing criminals. This paper has shown 
that contrary to what theories of neighborhood cohesion and violence might expect, 
higher levels of neighborhood cohesion actually result in higher levels of vigilante 
violence. Third, the findings presented here also illustrate the need to continually test 
theory and findings in new, and in particular, non-Western contexts, as the bulk of the 
literature on neighborhood cohesion has been conducted in the West, particularly in 
Chicago. The findings presented here suggest that applying theories of cohesion and 
violence to non-Western contexts forces us to reexamine existing assumptions in ways 
that will advance our theoretical understandings of how neighborhood contexts matter 
in the face of rapid and unplanned urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa and other non-
Western contexts. 
It has been posited here, and indeed the findings lend partial support to the 
notion that while many neighborhoods, particularly in the Western context, are able to 
translate greater cohesion and the resulting increased capacities for informal social 
control into non-violent social control, via the police and court systems. However, 
where communities are marked by pronounced marginalization and a lack of resources, 
the capacity for social control might not always be expressed through non-violent, 
legitimate, or legal avenues. Further research should focus on the institutional 
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capacities that facilitate or inhibit the link between cohesion and non-violent informal 
social control.     
 Future research would also do well to examine the relationships between 
neighborhood cohesion and other forms of collective violence like political violence, 
protest violence, civil war, and terrorism. Additional scholarship could also expand 
upon the topic presented here by examining the effect that vigilante violence has on 
local crime levels in communities. By looking at rates of vigilante violence and crime 
in communities, we would be able to assess how effective vigilante violence is in 
deterring crime (if at all). A very provocative, albeit quite difficult, vein of research 
could compare the efficacy of violent and non-violent forms of informal social control 
in deterring crime across communities. 
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Vigilante violence tends to take place in areas or situations in which the state is 
unable or unwilling to provide for the safety of certain groups. Vigilantism can be 
understood as an alternative means of controlling crime and providing security where 
the state does not. The violent punishment inherent in vigilante activity is with the 
ultimate goal of providing safety and security, and thus should theoretically “fit the 
crime” and not be excessive. However, in many acts of vigilante violence this is not 
the case, and vigilantism takes on an extraordinarily violent character. This paper 
examines vigilante violence in three South African townships through the micro-
sociological perspective of violence developed by Randall Collins (2008), ‘forward 
panic.’ Forward panic is a process whereby the tension and fear marking most 
potentially violent conflict situations is suddenly released, bringing about extraordinary 
acts of violence. Based on data from 18 interviews gathered from the Johannesburg 
townships of Diepsloot, Freedom Park, and Protea South, I analyze respondents’ 
accounts and experiences with vigilante violence using the framework of forward 
panic. The data confirms that many acts of vigilante violence in South Africa’s 
townships can be clearly categorized as episodes of forward panic and that although 
Collins’ conception of forward panic focuses on the individual, the conditions which 
create the emotional potential for forward panic in an individual can be structural, and 





According to Weber, “the modern state can only be defined sociologically in 
terms of a specific means which is peculiar to the state, as it is to all other political 
associations, namely physical violence” (Weber 1919:310). In other words, the 
defining attribute of the state is that it its sole authority in exercising violence 
legitimately, typically through institutions like the military. Additionally, non-state 
entities can also exercise legitimate violence, although their source of legitimacy is the 
state (Weber 1919). Examples of such non-state entities include private security 
organizations, and even armed private citizens, who are sanctioned by the state to 
operate and employ violence within the bounds of the laws of the state, at least in theory 
(Kleck 1988; see Pinker 2011; Shearing and Stenning 1983). Under Weber’s 
conception, if violence is not sanctioned by the state it is necessarily illegitimate. The 
illegitimate use of violence is manifested primarily through violent criminal activities 
like muggings, rape, and murder (Pinker 2011; Weber 1919). This distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence, however, assumes that the state has the ability to 
consolidate legitimate violence within its institutions. Hypothetically, institutions that 
employ legitimate violence are subject to control though political processes. However, 
in many situations, this is not the case: South America and Africa offer numerous 
examples of militaries breaking free from the regulation of the political process and the 
state. Typically, when the state does not have control of its institutions that are meant 
to maintain social control and formal methods of social control erode, the legitimacy 
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of the state is under question, as in the conditions of revolution (Goldstone 1991; see 
Malesevic 2010; Skocpol 1979).  
 To be perceived as legitimate, a state must also be able to limit the use of 
illegitimate violence within its boundaries. Typically this occurs through processes of 
deterrence via threat of punishment by the state, i.e. corporal or capital punishment 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). If the state is unable to properly deter or punish 
those employing illegitimate violence, its own monopoly on violence is undermined. 
The inability to prevent illegitimate violence theoretically results in a deterioration of 
social control, increases in crime, as the typical deterrence to such activity is largely 
absent through formal systems (Kreager, Lyons, and Hayes 2011). In situations where 
states are unable to contain violence within their institutions and illegitimate violence 
in the form of crime is widespread, new methods of informal social control and 
deterring crime may become possible and necessary.  
 This article explores the use of vigilante violence as a method of informal social 
control and crime deterrence in the absence of fully functioning police systems in 
townships around Johannesburg, South Africa. Drawing on interview data collected 
from individuals involved in vigilantism or informal policing, I utilize Collins’ (2008) 
micro-sociological theory of violence and his concept of ‘forward panic’ to understand 
particularly violent episodes of vigilante violence. This article thus advances forward 
panic as a tool to examine and understand particular episodes of gratuitous violence 
and also contributes to more generally to the knowledge on informal social control, 
particularly in situations where informal social control methods are violent. 
Additionally, research in the South African context can shed light on how informal 
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social control is employed in other settings experiencing substantial political, 
economic, and/or social transitions.    
 
Vigilantism and the State 
Classic and popular examples of alternative methods of deterring crime in the 
absence of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence can be found in the 
different manifestations of what is popularly known as ‘vigilantism’ that have occurred 
in nearly all societies at one point or another (Abrahams 1998; Kirsch and Gratz 2010; 
Pratten and Sen 2008).  Vigilantism remains a largely understudied area and academic 
definitions of ‘vigilantism’ have varied widely (Abrahams 1998; de la Roche 1996; 
Godoy 2004; Kirsch and Gratz 2010; see Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974). Johnston 
(1996) provides what is now considered a classic definition of vigilantism as “a social 
movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force—or threatened force—by 
autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the transgression of institutionalized 
norms by individuals or groups—or to their potential or imputed transgression. Such 
acts are focused upon crime control and/or social control and aim to offer assurances 
(or 'guarantees') of security both to participants and to other members of a given 
established order (232).  
 Not surprisingly, the relationship between vigilantism and the state is primarily 
an antagonistic one. According to Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), vigilantism arises 
in situations where discontent with the government’s formal goals and achievements is 
high and “the potential for vigilantism varies positively with the intensity and scope of 
belief that a regime is ineffective in dealing with the challenges to the prevailing 
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sociopolitical order” (1974:545). Referring back to Weber’s monopoly on violence, 
discontent with the state is high when the state claims a monopoly on violence (goal) 
but is unable to enforce it or contain violence solely within its institutions 
(achievement).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Abrahams (1998) more critically focuses on the 
relationship between the state and vigilantism. He argues that state inefficiencies in 
securing a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence result in ‘frontier zones,’ areas 
on the edges of the power and authority of the state, where illegitimate forms of 
violence are present and as a result vigilantism is able and likely to emerge. In many 
cases frontier zones are the physical frontiers of states, such as state borders, unsettled 
areas, or contested borderlands as in the popular examples of the American West in the 
19th century including San Francisco and Montana (Abrahams 1996), or the 
“minutemen” on the contemporary US-Mexico border (Chavez 2008). In many other 
cases, however, frontier zones are areas well within the geographic boundaries of the 
state but “where the state is viewed as ineffective or corrupt, and [vigilantism] often 
constitutes a criticism of the failure of state machinery to meet the felt needs of those 
who resort to it” (Abrahams 1998:9). In locations and/or situations in which the state 
is proven or perceived to be unable to satisfy demands for law, order, and safety, 
vigilantism becomes a predictable and even “natural,” response (Abrahams 1998:52). 
Operating in frontier zones where the state’s monopoly on violence is unclear, 
the primary goal of vigilantism according to Rosenbaum and Sederberg is “deterrence: 
their tactics consist of threats and sanctions… The range of vigilante activities seems 
to extend from subtle and restrained used of force to acts of brutal compulsion and 
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retribution. Violent force may not be used on all occasions, but its future utilization is 
always implied” (1974:27-28). Thus according to this conception, violence is central 
to vigilante activity even if, seemingly paradoxically, the ultimate motivation of 
vigilantism is a desire for law, order, and safety (Abrahams 1998). To stress the 
centrality of violence in vigilantism is not to imply that any and all forms of violence 
are employed and/or acceptable. Just as state sanctioned forms of punishment should 
hypothetically be in proportion to the crime committed, in order to be considered just 
(Felson 2009), so too should violent vigilante punishment (Harris 2001; Zimring 2004). 
Vigilante actions that are either “too weak” or “too harsh” can both be deemed 
illegitimate and thus be rendered ineffective as a means of achieving their goal of 
controlling crime and/or providing order and safety (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974). 
Regarding effective forms of punishment, Durkheim asserts that punishment however 
must not be “a gratuitous act of cruelty” and the “criminal should suffer in proportion 
to his crime” (Durkheim 1893:63; see also Pinker 2011). Herein lies the primary social 
control potential of vigilante activity and social control violence more generally (de la 
Roche 1996; Kreuzer 2008). Since the ultimate goal of vigilante violence is to provide 
or restore order in the absence of state mechanisms to do so, vigilante violence, in 
theory, should be calculated and controlled. Yet, vigilante actions frequently become 
extremely violent and gratuitous (see Abrahams 1998; Kirsch and Gratz 2010; Pratten 
and Sen 2008). If the motivations and goals of vigilante violence are undermined by 
excessive violence, why then do some instances of vigilante action take on incredibly 




Forward Panic and a Micro-Sociological Perspective on Violence  
Collins’ (2008) theory of violence, in which he focuses on micro-sociological 
factors, rather than structural conditions, provides one plausible explanation for why 
vigilante violence often becomes excessively and gratuitously violent, which 
potentially undermines the ultimate social control goals of the activity. Collins argues 
that contrary to what most macro explanations assume, violence is not easy and if a 
situation is to result in violence it must overcome the “emotional field” of tension and 
fear surrounding all potentially violent situations and if that tension and fear is not 
overcome, then violence will not result (2008). Although different pathways exist to 
circumvent or overcome the tension/fear surrounding confrontational and potentially 
violent situations, ‘forward panic’ is particularly useful for understanding vigilante 
violence as it is frequently involved in instances of crowd/collective violence. 
According to Collins, forward panic “starts with tension and fear in a conflict situation. 
[Where] the tension is prolonged and built up … [and is] striving toward a climax” 
(Collins 2008:85). In situations marked by forward panic, when the opportunity comes 
to overcome the tension/fear, emotions and actions erupt forcefully, overpowering the 
actors, “carrying them on to actions that they would normally not approve of” (Collins 
2008:85). Furthermore, violent conflicts in which forward panic occurs often result in 
actors entering an “emotional tunnel of violent attack” and a “moral holiday,” in which 
behavior that is not normally socially acceptable is possible and permissible (Collins 
2008:87). These situations often result in unstoppable frenzies centered on rage, in 
which incredibly violent acts and ‘overkill’ -- the carry over of violent acts well past 
the point of victory -- occur frequently. When this occurs, violent acts like vigilantism 
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tend to spiral out of control and resemble atrocities more associated with lynchings--
rather than targeted and calculated instances of punishment or justice. In these 
situations violence is taken above and beyond what is “necessary,” and the potential of 
these acts of vigilante violence in providing law, order, and peace, which is their 
ultimate goal, is likely undermined (Kreuzer 2008; Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1972).  
Studies employing Collins’ micro-sociological theoretical perspective of 
violence are limited and those focusing explicitly on forward panic are limited even 
further (Klusemann 2010; Levine, Taylor, Best 2011; Mazur 2009). Klusemann (2010) 
engages Collins’ micro-sociological approach to violence in his study of the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre in which over 7,000 Bosnian-Muslim men were killed by the 
Bosnian Serb Army. Using a range of data Kluseman argues that although macro 
conditions may motivate a massacre, emotional dynamics are critical to understanding 
where and why extreme atrocities occur and that micro interactions and emotional 
momentum are necessary for the situational turning points that ultimately lead to 
atrocities. While Kluseman utilizes Collins’ broader micro-sociological theory, he does 
not explore the concept of forward panic directly.  
Given that Collins’ theory straddles the sometimes-blurry lines between social, 
psychological, and even biological, it has drawn substantial criticisms from both the 
social and the “hard sciences.” From within sociology, Felson (2009) contends that 
Collins’ theory is unconformable, relies too heavily on “anecdotes” and ignores the 
more relevant quantitative literature. Additional heavily critical reviews were published 
in Nature and Science immediately following the publication of Collins’ (2008) work. 
Laitin (2008) and Wilson and Daly (2008) criticize Collins’ theory as being vague, 
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relying too heavily on metaphors, ultimately being too informal and unmeasureable, 
and thus not really explanatory.  
The only study (to my knowledge) that focuses directly on forward panic does 
not interrogate the concept from a sociological perspective, but in efforts to address the 
criticisms outlined above, centers on a “hormonal interpretation” of forward panic, 
replacing “Collins’ metaphors with tangible and measurable hormonal mechanisms” 
(435). In his study, Mazur documents the “real behavioral mechanisms...based on the 
hormones testosterone and cortisol” [emphasis mine] underlying forward panic, 
concluding that forward panic is the result of the changes in hormones that occur during 
confrontation situations. 
To address the criticisms outlined above I first provide a clear sociological 
definition and operationalizing of forward panic based on Collins’ work (2008; 2009; 
2012). I then apply this operationalization to vigilante violence in South African 
townships to understand why episodes of vigilante violence are often marked by 
extreme and gratuitous violence. Furthermore, I contribute to the ongoing discussion 
of micro and macro causes of violence, arguing that the micro-level processes of 
forward panic described by Collins can occur on a larger scale if the pre-conditions for 
forward panic pervade the macro-level processes and structures of a community. 
Whereas others have argued for shifting Collins’ micro-sociological theory to the 
psychological or biological (Laitin 2008; Mazur 2009; Wilson and Daly 2008), I offer 
a purely sociological operationalization of forward panic. I then link the literature on 
vigilante violence and forward panic by presenting a brief discussion regarding the 




The Stages of Forward Panic  
To provide a more clear and precise understanding of forward panic as a 
sociological process, it is helpful to break the concept into stages, as it is typically a 
sequential process. The first stage, the build up of tension and/or fear is a period of 
tense standoff between two sides threatening violence; this could include actual 
fighting, violent confrontations, and threats (perceived or actual) of violence. Nearly 
all potentially violent confrontations require some level of tension or fear as a necessary 
precursor to the violence. In forward panic, however, this tension or fear is prolonged 
over a period of time, building so as to eventually erupt in an emotional rush. This 
period of tension/fear typically occurs in the events immediately before a violent 
episode, for instance in a police chase before an act of police brutality against the driver 
of the automobile (Collins 2008). However, in his discussion of crowd violence and 
ethnic riots, Collins argues that this tension/fear can be the result “structural conditions 
in the background, more long-term in nature, which affect whether ethnic groups have 
an antagonistic relationship” [emphasis mine] (Collins 2008:115). In reference to 
tension/fear specifically between ethnic groups, it is fair to assume that structural 
conditions could thus create antagonistic relationships between other groups as well 
(i.e. police and citizens, criminals and victims, etc).  
 The second stage in the sequence is the sudden resolution in favor of one side 
in which the built up tension/fear in stage one is suddenly resolved or overcome in 
favor of one side, with one side gaining control. This process often occurs because one 
side has displayed a sudden weakness or vulnerability, for instance when one side runs 
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away, has been caught, handcuffed, fallen down, or been isolated from support, etc. 
Both the “build up of tension/fear” and the “sudden resolution in favor of one side” 
refer to events and processes that occur prior to an outbreak of violence. The third stage, 
the rapid increase in numerical superiority of one side over the other, or “piling on,” is 
the process occurring immediately after a sudden resolution in favor of one side and 
consists of the numerical, physical, and emotional domination of one group over the 
other. This occurs immediately after the sudden resolution in favor of one side, whereby 
through the sudden display of vulnerability or weakness, participation by those who 
were previously bystanders is easier (i.e. one side has been caught or fallen down) and 
less risky (i.e. one side has been hand-cuffed), often increasing the ferocity of the 
dominating group. The fourth stage, the prolonged attacking of the weaker side even 
after the conflict is over and won, or “overkill,” refers to excessively violent or brutal 
attacks on defenseless individuals and attacks that go far beyond what is required for 
victory, as in the attacking or mutilating of dead bodies. According to Collins, those 
involved in overkill “fire more bullets than they need; they not only kill but destroy 
everything in sight; they throw more punches and kicks; they attack dead bodies” 
(Collins 2008:94).  
 The stages of forward panic as it was originally conceptualized take place on 
an individual-level. In this paper however, as has been touched on above, forward panic 
and its specific stages will be conceptualized as potentially occurring in groups or 
communities that are subjected to the same micro-level process on the aggregate that 




Data and Methods 
The data for this research was collected in three townships just outside of the 
city of Johannesburg (Diepsloot, Freedom Park, and Protea South). These townships 
provide an ideal context to examine the issues surrounding crime, policing, and 
vigilante justice. Diepsloot, Freedom Park, and Protea South all include a mixture of 
formal and informal settlements and are nearly homogenously black and impoverished 
to varying degrees, typical of many townships throughout the country. All three 
communities have incredibly high rates of crime and limited access to policing or 
private security. When policing services are available they are often seen as ineffective 
in controlling crime through inefficiencies in the criminal justice system or corruption. 
As a result, many township residents do not always rely on the police to deal with 
criminal activity. By Abraham’s definition, all three of these communities could be 
considered frontier zones, which are ripe for vigilantism (1998). 
According to Lofland and Lofland (1995), semi-structured interviewing is 
used to “achieve analyses that 1) are attuned to aspects of human group life, 2) depict 
aspects of that life, and 3) provide perspectives on that life that are simply not available 
to or prompted by other methods of research” (5). The data for this analysis consists of 
semi-structured interviews with township residents who were intimately familiar with 
vigilante activity or mob violence, broadly defined. In order to gain initial access to 
interviewees I employed a research assistant from Freedom Park to act as an entry point 
and arrange initial interviews. From my initial contacts I employed snowball sampling 
techniques for the subsequent interviews, a convenience sampling technique whereby 
initial interviewees suggest new ones. Given the sensitive nature of the research, I never 
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attempted to contact interviewees without an introduction, thus snowball sampling was 
the most effective sampling technique available to me. This strategy is widely 
employed in the study of high-risk activities (Kalyvas 2006; Viterna 2006). During July 
and August 2011 I conducted 18 interviews with 17 people (one participant was 
interviewed initially, and then again a day after a vigilante/mob violence incident with 
which he was involved), at which point I met theoretical saturation (Guest, Bunce, and 
Johnson 2006). My research assistant was present for 17 of the 18 interviews. Some of 
the interviewees were more comfortable expressing themselves in Zulu and in these 
cases my research assistant translated interviewees for me as necessary. 
All 17 interviewees were with Black South Africans. 14 were male and three 
were female. The ages of the interviewees ranged from late 20s to early 50s. 
Interviewees were spread across a variety of low-wage or informal occupations or were 
unemployed. Five of the interviewees were from the township of Diepsloot, four were 
from Freedom Park, and eight were from Protea South. Two of the interviewees in the 
sample were free-lance journalists. Both live and work in Diepsloot and primarily cover 
“mob violence” stories for a national tabloid newspaper. Interview topics covered 
issues related to crime, policing, and vigilante justice. The interview questions focused 
specifically on the interviewee’s experiences with and views of the SAPS, Community 
Policing Forums (organizations instituted by the state after apartheid to control crime 
by addressing the contentious relationship between the SAPS and township 
communities), and the criminal justice system in the country, experiences with and 
views of informal policing/mob justice, xenophobic attacks, and the violence that often 
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accompanies informal policing and mob justice. Interviews ranged in length from 23 
minutes to 2 hours and 33 minutes, with an average interview length of 56 minutes.  
I transcribed the interviews verbatim, only omitting repeated phrases such as 
“um,” “you know,” and “what what” (a common South African colloquialism), etc. 
The interviews that contained Zulu portions were transcribed by my research assistant 
under the same guidelines. When necessary, excerpts from transcripts used in this paper 
have been edited for readability while maintaining the interviewee’s original meaning. 
Additionally, pseudonyms have been used throughout this paper to protect the identity 
of the interviewees. Data were analyzed using the qualitative data analysis software, 
NVIVO9. Initial analysis consisted of open coding to allow for unanticipated themes 
to emerge, after which these codes were grouped and patterns were established across 
cases.   
I operationalize forward panic into codes corresponding with the sequence of 
events in a forward panic situation as defined by Collins (2008): “Build up of 
Tension/Fear,” “Sudden Resolution in favor of one side,” “Piling on,” and “Overkill.” 
These codes are derived from the different stages of forward panic outlined above. 
“Build up of Tension/Fear” is operationalized as a period of tense standoff between 
two sides threatening violence; this could include actual fighting, violent 
confrontations, and threats (perceived or actual) of violence. “Sudden Resolution in 
favor of one side” is operationalized as situations in which the built up tension/fear is 
suddenly resolved or overcome in favor of one side, with one side gaining control. The 
third code, “Piling on,” is the process occurring immediately after a sudden resolution 
in favor of one side and is operationalized as the numerical, physical, and emotional 
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domination of one group over the other, which primarily includes references to the 
number of people involved, as well as the weapons and ferocity employed by the 
dominating group. “Overkill” is the prolonged beating or attacking even when the 
conflict is over and won. It is operationalized as excessively violent or brutal attacks on 
defenseless individuals, attacks far beyond what is require for victory as in the attacking 
or mutilating of dead bodies. “Piling on” and “Overkill” refer to situations and actions 
occurring during an episode of forward panic.  
 
Results 
Although forward panic was developed as a micro-sociological approach to 
understanding violence by focusing primarily on individual emotions leading up to, 
and during, violent episodes, this paper argues that the conditions and processes of 
forward panic can take place on a much broader, potentially macro, level. This 
argument is based on the notion that the individual-level conditions of forward panic, 
particularly the build up of tension/fear, can be experienced by a large number of 
individuals within a certain area and over an extended period time. In his discussion of 
crowd violence and ethnic riots, Collins very quickly touches on the possibility of 
multiple actors experiencing the pre-conditions of forward panic simultaneously and 
for an extended period of time. Collins’ discussion of these processes is very brief. 
While other attempts to validate or test forward panic have focused more on the micro 
(even biological) (see Mazur 2009), I instead focus on the more firmly sociological 
processes, linking micro and macro-level processes as they contribute to violence.  
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Build up of Tension/Fear 
Build up of Tension/Fear was mentioned regularly throughout all 18 of the 
interviews. In the interviews, the tension/fear between the community and police was 
most often expressed as the result of failure of the police to deal with crime, thus 
serving to exacerbate the tension/fear between the communities and criminals. 
‘Discontent with police’ was mentioned by all interviewees. Although forward panic 
against the police does sometimes occur, more often than not that tension/fear is built 
up and expressed towards criminals. References to tension/fear as related to criminals 
also appeared in all of the interviews. There is, however, substantial overlap between 
tension/fear resulting from discontent with police and tension/fear as a result of issues 
with criminals.     
 
Build up of Tension/Fear: police misconduct 
 
 All interviewees expressed complaints against the police for misconduct in the 
form of the police treating victims poorly or with hostility, not arresting criminals, 
releasing criminals once arrested, and/or taking bribes. One of the most common 
themes in the discussion of police misconduct was that the police did not detain 
criminals in the desired manner or for the proper/desired amount of time. Many 
interviewees complained of negligence, bribery and even collusion between the police 
and criminals. In regards to police misconduct, particularly around the issue of bribery, 
it is rather difficult to parse out what were simply the interviewees’ perceptions of 
police accepting bribes and when bribery had actually occurred. However, given the 
high level of police corruption in South Africa (Pillay 2013; Singh 2005), it is safe to 
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assume that many of the allegations of bribery were based in reality. Regardless of 
whether the police conduct referenced is real or perceived, the consequences are 
identical.   
         This perspective can be seen in the case of a man whom I call Dumi, the 
chairperson of the public safety/domestic abuse prevention organization Men as Safety 
Promoters (MASP) in the township of Freedom Park. As the chairperson of MASP, 
Dumi is heavily involved in community affairs, regularly attends community meetings, 
and patrols the streets on foot as part of his position. He is also a particularly outspoken 
critic of the police and African National Congress (ANC) (South Africa’s ruling party 
since the first democratic elections) and did not shy away from vocalizing his 
potentially controversial opinions and assertions about either body. In his interview 
Dumi repeatedly claimed that the police themselves engage in criminal activity while 
on duty. Recounting a recent incident of police misconduct, Dumi said, “I can attest 
last week Wednesday at around 10:30 in the evening, I witnessed four police officers, 
all of them they were smoking heroin, nyopi (a local drug), they smoked it from ten in 
the evening to two in the morning... on the same day we heard that two men were 
raped.” Situations like these, which appear to be rather common, create tension/fear in 
the community through the aggravation as a result of the blatant misconduct of the 
police but also in that the misconduct can oftentimes lead to, or be perceived as leading 
to, more crime (specifically in this case the rape of two men). 
          The misconduct of the police also creates tension/fear when community 
members widely see criminals as facing little or no punishment for their crimes even 
when arrested by the police. This is most commonly perceived as being the result of 
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bribery, whereby suspects are able to buy their release from the police. Highlighting 
the frequency with which this occurs, a phrase occurring nearly universally throughout 
the interviews was that if the “police arrest him today, tomorrow he’ll be free.” While 
it is sometimes unclear if suspects are actually bribing the police or being let out 
legitimately on bail, the frequency with which people alleged this misconduct suggests 
that bribery occurs with regularity. Jabulani, a CPF chairperson from Diepsloot who is 
a supporter and participant of mob violence describes a case where a police captain in 
Diepsloot was actually arrested for accepting bribery: 
The police rob our community. They are taking bribery from the community. 
When we complain to the police they say ‘No, its just allegation.’ But through 
the help of the police outside Diepsloot, if the captain of the station here has 
been arrested fro bribery. He went down here at the tavern checking their 
permits and their license and said ‘You’re license is expired. So now you must 
pay R1500 [about $150].’ They’ve been doing that all along. Until we finally 
raised it with the Station Commissioner to say he needs to do something about 
it. It’s his policemen who are robbing the community. He said he would put the 
police in check. They arrested that same policeman… They arrested their 
captain there at the station. We told the Station Commissioner, ‘No bail for that 
policeman. No bail, he must stay there.’ 
In addition to illustrating the difficulty of dealing with the issue of bribery even for a 
CPF chairperson, Jabulani also touches on a general dissatisfaction with the bail 
system. Since bribery is perceived to be so rampant, it is often difficult or impossible 
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for community members to distinguish between situations where suspects have bribed 
the police or have been released on bail.    
 Whether a suspect actually bribes the police or is released on bail (and is 
perhaps perceived to have bribed the police), the consequences in regards to creating 
tension/fear in the community are the same whether the police misconduct is real or 
perceived. Lindsey, a wiry young and enthusiastic local activist in Protea South and a 
vocal supporter of mob violence notes the seeming futility of turning over a suspected 
criminal to the police and the anger it causes: “When we give [the suspect] to the police, 
I wont get my stuff back. Tomorrow I’ll see him walking free, so whats the use? I 
bought those things with hard earned cash, and then they get stolen by someone who 
I’ll see tomorrow. That thing it eats my heart out. So its better to take them out.” 
Lindsey highlights how the release of criminals--whether through bribery or bail—
leaves these criminals free to continue committing crime, creating anguish for victims. 
Furthermore, this form of police misconduct also creates tension/fear between the 
specific perpetrators and their victims.  
 In Protea South, Lungile, the chairperson of the local chapter of Landless 
Peoples’ Movement (LPM), a social movement organization that advocates for 
squatters and informal settlement dwellers, illustrates how police misconduct can in 
some cases threaten the lives of the victims of crime: “Some of the criminals are the 
police department’s friends or the friends of the police, and maybe they used this 
bribery to get out of the police station. And when the criminals come out, the person 
who opened the case... their life is in danger.” This sentiment was echoed by Thabo, a 
young former CPF member in Protea South:  
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The Protea Glen police station doesn’t know how to manage crime here, 
because they get lost in every thing, because today we get the criminal, 
tomorrow is coming back again and that criminal is not coming back again to 
say ‘I am going to change the things that I was doing.’ He is coming back to the 
place where he was caught and he will say ‘You can’t do anything to me, I am 
back again and I will do it again.’ You see that thing make the community of 
Protea South to get angry and to say there is nothing that can be done by the 
police.  
 
He later goes on to talk about how this police misconduct and its consequences caused 
him to quit his work with the CPF: “I was working for the CPF and we arrested two 
guys with stolen property and the police don’t do anything on that thing. I had to resign 
from community patrol because at the end, I’m going to be killed. And I left my 
community stranded with nothing… We help the police but the police doesn't help us.” 
Regardless of whether these claims are accurate (although the frequency to which they 
are made would suggest that many are) the mere perception that the police are letting 
criminals off, free to threaten or attack their victims again, is enough to cultivate 
tension/fear in the community and generate very real consequences in these 
communities. 
         The tension/fear due to the perception and/or reality of widespread police 
misconduct creates a situation where members of the community are dissatisfied with 
the police in their response to crime. This process creates antagonism between the 
community and the police as well as the community and criminals, as criminals are 
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perceived to be free to terrorize the community as they please. Furthermore, the 
repeated references to the police releasing criminals for bribes (or otherwise) creates 
tension and fear because the community not only perceives criminals as frequently 
going unpunished for their crimes, but there are situations in which they actually are. 
 
Build up of Tension/Fear: police response time 
 
Another frequently cited complaint against the police was their response time 
to emergency calls. All interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with how long it took 
the police to respond to calls and crimes in progress. This view was shared by both 
those who worked very closely with the police, like Community Policing Forum (CPF) 
chairpersons, as well as those who have had very little formal interaction with the 
police. Although problems with infrastructure are a substantial issue in townships and 
many townships do not have their own police stations (Gastrow and Shaw 2001; Shaw 
2002:11), even people in those areas with active police stations cited regular 
experiences with unreasonably long and frustrating delays in police response time. Of 
those who were interviewed in areas without an active police station, the delay in police 
response was far greater than could be accounted for in travel time. Dumi, the 
chairperson of MASP mentioned above, briefly explains this vast disparity in the 
distance of the police station from Freedom Park and response time of the police: “from 
here to the Eldorado Park police station, its about three minutes, but all the time when 
we’ll report a crime the police will come after two hours or three hours,” far longer 
than could be accounted for in driving time.  
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          Thabo, the former CPF member in Protea South who resigned as a result of a 
lack of support from the police, claims that police are blatantly ignoring calls: “We 
called the police and say ‘There is another guy who had been shot. Come and help.”… 
The police say ‘We are coming now,” but we wait and wait and they are going to say 
‘There is no van at the police station… there is no police person… wait for another to 
come and we are going to come to you.’ When you go to the police station you are 
going to find a van there.” Bheka, a rather serious and dedicated CPF chairperson from 
the township of Diepsloot who regularly interacts with the police as central part of his 
job, echoes this frustration when he recounts the situation of tension/fear when he 
would apprehend criminals and the closest police station was roughly 40 kilometers 
away: 
We operated for a long time without the police station, and people apprehend 
[a criminal] or maybe they do a citizen’s arrest and it takes for two, three, five 
hours, waiting for the police. So somewhere somehow they get emotional, you 
understand and that’s where it started. We’re not saying it’s right but that’s 
where it started. Once the police don’t come then they take the law into their 
own hands.  
As someone with an invested commitment in working with the police and dealing 
through legal means, it is readily apparent to Bheka how the context of struggling with 
slow police response times can create a tense emotional and dangerous situation where 
vigilante violence is understandable, if not sometimes inevitable, even among CPF 
members (who have a formal relationship with the police).  
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         In certain situations, the entire community might experience this tension/fear at 
the same time. Sam, a resident of Diepsloot and free-lance journalist who photographs 
vigilante justice in his community, describes a particularly violent night where the lack 
of a police response was felt on a larger scale due to the widespread violence of the 
evening:  
We had something like eleven murders Friday night and people were angry with 
the situation. Because others even tried to phone the police at the time they were 
being robbed, the police never came... A lot of people were shot. I went to a 
tavern where three people were gunned down… So people were angry and 
when somebody came up and said no, I know where these criminals are living. 
People stood up and said “where are they, these people are killing us.” 
Sam recounts a situation where many people are simultaneously experiencing the 
tension/fear from police non-response in the form of a violent crime spree. The 
residents then become angry and decide to respond themselves while the crimes are 
still taking place. The heightened tension/fear in this situation is such that people are 
willing to risk their lives in pursuit of these criminals. 
         As a precursor to forward panic, the failure (or perception thereof) of the police 
to deal with or respond to crime contributes to forward panic in two important ways: 
1) by exacerbating the existing tension/fear associated with crime and 2) by firmly 
establishing these areas as frontier zones in which the next processes of forward panic 
can take place with little fear of interruption or repercussion by state authorities like 
the police.  
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Sudden Resolution of Tension in Favor of One Side 
The next stage in a forward panic that Collins’ discusses is the sudden resolution 
of tension/fear in favor of one side, which is often the result of something that brings 
widespread attention to a situation and tends to happen during a crime or shortly after 
a crime has been committed, when a numerically or physically superior group 
apprehends a criminal. Many of the interviewees mentioned that if people see someone 
struggling with another person, hear someone screaming or making a commotion, they 
will come out to see what is happening and often try to help the victim. The crowded 
nature of many townships further contributes to this process, as witnesses are likely to 
be more prevalent and able to respond more quickly than in other contexts. Sam, the 
free-lance journalist mentioned above, said that “once a person screams in this 
community, you say he is in trouble, the community comes… you can't scream a small 
thing, the people come running.” The scream alerts many people at once to a situation, 
and once they arrive, the tension/fear is resolved in the community’s favor. He also 
notes that screaming is taken seriously enough by the community, that you should not 
scream unless it is a serious matter. The serious nature of screaming further highlights 
the build up of tension/fear in these communities and its relationship with the sudden 
resolution of tension in favor of one side in that a high level of tension/fear needs to 
exist for a scream to trigger such a response from a community.  
Sudden Resolution of Tension in Favor of One Side: Whistling 
 
         The importance of alerting many people at once to a crime or disruption (like 
through a scream) has taken on a more institutionalized form than a simple scream, 
with many communities employing whistles as an alert system. The fact that many 
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communities employ whistles for this purpose points to the fact that there is a certain 
level of latent tension/fear that exists within the entire community at all times. Lindsey 
discusses how institutionalized and widespread the whistle is in her community: 
We discussed it in a meeting here in Zone 3, we have our own strategy of how 
to defend ourselves at night, the whistle is the first point that we are going to 
use if somebody is attacking a family. This plan that we have, even other zones 
they do the same. Also we don’t allow children to play with the whistles because 
we know the whistles is saying something, if the children are playing with the 
whistles then we have to talk to their parents and tell them that they must not 
allow to their children to play with the whistles. 
 Again here, the seriousness of the alert system is referenced. It is important that the 
effectiveness of this tool not be undermined through abuse. Lungile describes how the 
whistle system works, you blow the whistle to “call your neighbor and that neighbor 
calls another neighbor, so when we hear it, all of the neighbors come out.” Again, the 
density of townships contributes to both the effectiveness of the alert system in 
disseminating that a crime is in progress and the ability for people to respond to that 
crime rapidly.  
         An additional way the whistle serves to resolve tension/fear in favor of the 
community is to call people out from their houses to attack or hunt a suspect once he 
or she has already been caught. Given the congested nature of many townships, using 
the whistle to alert others creates a situation in which large numbers of people can 
gather in a matter of minutes, aware of a transgression and ready to respond. Jabulani 
explains how important the whistle is and how quickly is can resolve tension/fear in 
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favor of the community: “Once they blow the whistle, you must just surrender. You are 
dead.” Here Jabulani illustrates the common idea that the whistle is such an effective 
and institutionalized strategy that even criminals acknowledge its efficiency. Rather 
than attempting to run away, criminals who hear the whistle will often simply surrender 
rather than attempt to escape.   
Sudden Resolution of Tension in Favor of One Side: Sudden Weakness or Vulnerability 
 
         In addition to the whistle, another process by which tension/fear is resolved in 
favor of one side is when a small group of community members or a body like the 
Community Policing Forum will apprehend a criminal on their own, and once the 
community sees what is happening, they gather and attack the now vulnerable criminal. 
The tension/fear here is suddenly resolved by the fact that the criminal is in some sort 
of custody and thus particularly vulnerable. In describing an event in which the CPF 
apprehended three notorious criminals only to have them killed and burned by the 
community, Mandla, a scrappy young activist and former member of the CPF in Protea 
South who remains deeply involved in community issues, describes how a frustrated 
community quickly took advantage of the situation: “We tied them there… we tied 
their hands together with their legs, sitting down but the community started to see the 
agitation…People started to be angry (making a clapping noise)…There are some 
groups discussions and people are saying, “No, no why should we ask those people 
some questions? Why can’t we kill these people? They are butchers.”” Here, the 
apprehended criminals were incredibly vulnerable, as they were tied by their hands and 
feet and were completely defenseless against the community, even with the CPF trying 
to ward off an attack. 
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         Many of these situations in which the tension/fear is suddenly resolved or 
overcome are due to a prolonged build up of tension/fear and also the result of the fact 
that most of these townships are often highly congested. This situation results in many 
people at once being alerted to a situation through a noise like a scream or whistle, or 
by visibly witnessing a confrontation. It also creates a situation where many people are 
capable of reaching the location of a confrontation in a very short period of time, as 
many people are necessarily already close by. Indeed, in many situations, the sudden 
resolution of tension/fear also takes the form of Piling On, in that a rapid increase in 
the numerical superiority of one group resolves the tension/fear in favor of one side 
and allows an “emotional rush” of violence to surge forth. 
Piling On 
         The third stage in a forward panic situation is piling on and the theme came up 
in all of the interviews. It is the rapid increase in numerical superiority of one side over 
another, occurring simultaneously with or immediately after, the sudden resolution of 
tension/fear. Piling On allows one side to physically and emotionally dominate the 
other, who in most cases is defenseless or has given up. Through this process, violent 
aggression is made less risky and thus relatively easy. In most situations a criminal 
might be stronger than a victim, attack them when they are off guard, or have a weapon. 
In situations marked by Piling On, the victims suddenly gain the upper hand in the 
situation and the tension/fear bursts forth violently. Additionally, Piling On creates an 
intense emotional atmosphere that is particularly conducive to violence, as people’s 
anger and intense emotional state feed off of one another. 
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         In these townships, Piling On is fueled by the collective tension/fear, as well as 
the congestion that makes it easy to become aware of a confrontation and quickly 
become involved. Sometimes piling on occurs when people are called to the scene 
(occurring simultaneously with the sudden resolution of tension/fear), as Phila, another 
former CPF member and political activist in Protea South, describes, “immediately 
when someone is caught a lot of people scream, ‘Here is the thug!... And he was caught 
stealing this and that...’ and then people will come and he will be beaten by the 
community.”  
         The built up tension/fear in the community is highlighted by peoples’ 
willingness to participate in the violence: in many situations community members need 
only to see others responding to an incidence. As a result, many join in without any 
knowledge the crime that occurred or the events leading up to the confrontation. Sbu, 
another journalist from Diepsloot who primarily covers mob violence in his community 
for a The Daily Sun, a tabloid newspaper and also the most popular newspaper in the 
country, describes how this process takes place, “there are people who just come out of 
nowhere who would not even ask “What’s going on?”, they would just help and beat 
that person.” 
        Often people are so eager to take part that even in situations where a few people 
have captured a criminal and do not want others involved, they are unable to stop them. 
Mandla describes how quickly the community can respond and completely take over a 
situation, even overpowering the CPF:   
The answer of the community is to kill. There is no other thing. If you grab 
someone... I could catch someone here and… I wont even reach another zone. 
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The minute I go from here to the clinic (about 40 feet away)… the crowd is 
here, out at the clinic, they say, ‘Whats going on?’ They start and say, ‘No, no, 
no. Why you taking this man there to the station?’ They say ‘No, let’s beat this 
man up... they are killing you.’ 
  
Once the tension/fear has been resolved or overcome through piling on, people are, in 
many situations, ready and fervent perpetrators in the violence. 
         The nature of piling on, with many people joining in and attacking one side in 
very short period of time, makes it so that these outbursts of violence often occur 
incredibly quickly. Many people all at once are punching, kicking, beating with 
sjamboks (a cattle whip), throwing stones or bricks, or using whatever else they can 
find to attack a criminal. The journalist Sbu describes how quickly the process of piling 
on can result in death, “It only takes three minutes… he’s gone. Three minutes and he’s 
gone. The multitude of people of attacking one person with different weapons. Yeah, 
it takes only three minutes.” 
Overkill 
         The last stage in a forward panic is overkill, which was talked about in all of 
the interviews. Overkill is the process whereby people are caught up in the intense and 
collective emotional atmosphere or “tunnel” of forward panic and cannot stop their 
momentum. Many interviewees spoke of situations of piling on with phrases like, “you 
can’t stop the community,” where the community is “unstoppable” or “uncontrollable” 
to describe the rapid and unified emotional and violent escalation. When asked, “Who 
participates?,” most responded with “The whole community,” that is to say the 
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“community” is acting as a collective group in the violence. The “community” is often 
so immersed in the emotional atmosphere that people who do try to intervene or prevent 
the violence in any way are attacked as well. Whether it be people questioning the guilt 
of the suspect, defending the suspect, or even interventions by CPFs or the police, 
anyone seen as voicing transgressions are then at risk of attack because they are seen 
as “siding with the suspect.”  
 The emotional atmosphere is so intense and widespread that simply asking if 
the criminal is actually guilty can put one’s life at risk. Sbu, describes the risk of trying 
to stop or even question the community once they are in this state: 
[You] can never do that. You become a victim. They never stop the mob. You 
can see your brother there but you can’t do anything. They will kill you as well. 
You will die with him... they have these preconceived ideas. And it is 
uncontrollable. When the mob is beating someone you can never come and say 
something...you’ll be killed... They will say “No, you are doing it with him, 
thats why you support him.” So you will also get killed. 
 This solidarity in emotional frenzy, which is free from opposition or even 
skepticism, creates an environment where people are feeding off of and reinforcing one 
another’s intense emotions. The group acts to amplify the emotions of individuals and 
often creates a ‘moral holiday’, where traditional moral constraints are ignored and 
individuals support and encourage one another in activities normally forbidden (Collins 
2008:98, 243). In these situations the atmosphere is often marked by elation, 
exhilaration or celebration. Numerous references were made to the jovial mood of 
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community members during these incredibly violent episodes, where people were 
singing and dancing while a suspect was being beaten to death.   
Overkill: Burning 
 
         The burning of victims was referenced in the majority of the interviews. 
Although far from occurring in the majority of instances of vigilante violence, the 
burning of victims or their dead bodies illustrates how incredibly violent forward panic 
can get during situations of overkill. In a violent situation free from physical opposition 
or expressed moral disagreement, no one can question the group if it decides that it 
wants to escalate the violence to the point of burning a victim, something that would 
be morally apprehensible and unthinkable in nearly any other situation. Burning is 
undoubtedly overkill as it is hardly the most efficient way of killing a person, happens 
well past the point of the victory of the group, and in many cases happens after the 
person is already dead; there is much more violence than necessary even in the context 
of the already very violent situation. Sbu describes the mood of people just before the 
burning of someone alive: 
It is just for the fun of it. I think it is just for the fun of it. Because you find 
people laughing you know... others are excited when they look at it. They are 
excited by what is happening. That person is naked, they are excited, they are 
laughing, they are chanting around that particular person. You see while others 
are soaking him [in paraffin]… yeah I think it is just for the fun of it. 
As Sbu describes, the burning of alleged criminal alive is not functional violence in the 
way that beating or stoning might be perceived in the context of the violent episode: it 
is well beyond what might be deemed “necessary” to punish or even to kill the alleged 
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criminal. Instead, within the context of forward panic and the subsequent moral 
holiday, the burning of an alleged criminal borders on recreational.   
         However, once the moral holiday is over the brutality of such acts becomes 
clear. Jabulani, who despite his language was visibly excited in relaying this event, 
reflects back on one such horrific situation: 
Sometimes it disgusts me when the community wants... after stoning they want 
to burn the person...  It doesn’t... I started to shiver. You see...I have seen two 
criminals from Mozambique, they were tied like this (with their hands together) 
and their legs. They took the plastics... the plastic bags and threw them on top 
of them and then they light. They were crying. They were crying until that fire 
come up...everything eaten by fire. 
All of the components of a forward panic situation work together to create these 
incredible episodes of violence. Indeed, forward panic often takes on the characteristics 
of what Collins calls an “atrocity”, “it is patently unfair: the strong against the weak; 
the armed against the unarmed (or the disarmed); the crowd against the individual... [it] 
is a very ugly-looking event” (Collins 2008:94). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This research yields a number of important findings and contributions to the 
theoretical development of forward panic. First, the operationalization of forward panic 
in purely sociological terms through clearly defining the sequential processes and 
providing a coding scheme for forward panic should address many of the concerns 
leveled by critics of this theoretical perspective on violence. A clear operationalization 
should assuage Laitin’s (2008) concerns regarding coding schemes and theory 
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confirmation. Furthermore, this operationalization places forward panic firmly within 
the body of sociology. Where Mazur (2009) attempted to address the “tangibility” of 
this theory by focusing on biological process, this paper has shown that such a complete 
shift in focus is unnecessary as the processes of forward panic are already readily 
apparent and tangible within the sociological.  
 Secondly, the processes of forward panic can occur at the group and/or 
community level. It is clear from this research that the micro-sociological pre-
conditions for forward panic can occur simultaneously in many people at once and can 
occur over a longer period of time than described in Collins’ original work. 
Specifically, the build up of tension or fear that is a necessary pre-cursor for forward 
panic situations can effect entire communities if they are subject to the same processes 
that might incur those same emotions at the individual-level. When these processes are 
structural, as in high levels of crime and corrupt and/or inefficient policing in a 
community, it becomes even more apparent that “micro and macro theories cannot be 
entirely distinct, since macro always contains micro within it” (Collins 2009).   
 The findings from this paper have important implications for future research 
using micro and macro approaches to understanding violence, research using forward 
panic in particular, and the study of informal social control and vigilantism. Returning 
to some of the concepts around vigilantism outlined earlier, it is clear that many of 
Johannesburg’s townships resemble Abrahams’ frontier zones and are areas where 
Weber’s state’s monopoly on violence is often non-existent, or at best severely 
fragmented. The lack of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence creates an 
environment marked by incredibly high levels of crime as well as a need, in absence of 
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the police, to control crime in the community by other means. These other means are 
usually various forms of vigilante justice, or the community “taking the law into its 
own hands.” Yet, the seemingly lawless context found in many townships and the build 
up of tension/fear as a result, lends itself to forward panic rather than the targeted and 
precise acts of violent punishment that would best serve the ultimate goals of 
vigilantism. Once forward panic is established, it bursts forth into levels of violence 
that move far beyond what could be considered an effective level of punishment to 
create social control. Instead, it could be argued the process of forward panic potentially 
undermines the social control potential of vigilante justice in Johannesburg's 
townships, turning them from situations in which the community takes the “law into 
their own hands” and finds solidarity in collective punishment, into very violent 
instances of collective violence and brutality that often more closely resemble atrocities 
like lynchings then the efforts of a concerned community trying to take back control 
and protect themselves. 
 Additionally, while I’ve argued that a more macro (i.e. group level or 
community level) approach to understanding forward panic is useful, focusing on the 
micro processes remains fundamental. Understanding gratuitous vigilante violence or 
mob justice via the micro-sociological approach of forward panic then, provides an 
optimistic take on an inherently negative social phenomenon (Kluseman 2009). If we 
are aware of the processes and pre-conditions of forward panics in South African 
townships, perhaps focusing efforts on disrupting these processes could result in 
reductions or preventions of mob violence. Research on effective interventions is then 
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likely to be increasingly fruitful and could have important impacts in reducing the 
instances of mob violence in townships. 
 In regards to the capacity for informal social control in communities, Drakulich 
and Crutchfield (2013) argue that informal social control is more likely to occur in 
more affluent neighborhoods, neighborhoods with a higher degree of residential 
stability, and where trust in the police is high. This is in part because residents see the 
benefits of participation in informal social control as outweighing the costs. Where 
police are perceived to be willing to support and engage with informal social control 
efforts, the costs for participation are reduced via reducing the perceived risk of 
retaliation or further victimization, and the benefits are increased through increased 
effectiveness. Following these findings one would assume that the capacity for 
informal social control in South African townships would be very low as these 
communities are typically marked by high poverty, racial segregation and isolation, 
low perceptions of police efficacy, and very high levels of distrust in police. If lack of 
faith in the police in particular “inhibits informal social control activities, and in fact 
explains lower capacities for informal social control in minority communities” 
(Drakulich and Crutchfield 2013:403), why then do we see such a high prevalence of 
vigilante violence in townships? Research on this might look to the perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of participating in informal social control. While the benefits are 
likely low due to poor police support, the costs might also be very low as the police 
may be unlikely or unable to punish those who participate in vigilante violence. 
 In addition to the capacity for informal social control in communities, this work 
also points to potential new research on the effectiveness of informal social control, 
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particularly violent social control. Given that the ultimate goal of vigilante violence is 
to restore law, order, and safety, and the use of violence or threat there of is primarily 
a means of punishment and/or deterrence to support this goal, it should follow that 
vigilante violence would be then be calculated and very deliberately directed at 
perpetrators or other symbolic targets. The data show that as a result of forward panic 
vigilante violence in townships is often poorly directed and very frequently goes well 
beyond what could be considered a calculated use of violence as punishment to restore 
law and order. Theoretically this should undermine the social control potential of 
vigilante violence but further research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of 
these forms of violent informal social control.  
 If the state remains unwilling or unable to effectively police and to provide 
formal social control in townships, the residents of these communities will continually 
resort to informal methods of social control. In contexts in which the specific micro-
sociological processes found in forward panic are experienced collectively, as in many 
townships communities, the result will likely be acts of collective violence often 










The three papers constituting this dissertation were motivated by a dearth of 
social scientific information on vigilante violence, specifically vigilante violence in 
South Africa, although the findings presented here will certainly be applicable in a 
variety of contexts. In addition to the study of vigilante violence, these papers shed 
light on a number of other relevant sociological questions surrounding violence, social 
control, policing, and contentious politics in the Global South.  
 The first paper of this dissertation addresses fundamental questions regarding 
the role of the state, specifically state (il)legitimacy, and vigilante violence. Theories 
of vigilante violence tend to emphasize the inability or incapacity of the state to provide 
security and safety for its citizens as a fundamental motivation and precursor for 
vigilantism. Central in many of these theories has been the notion that vigilantism is 
primarily a product of weak and/or failed states, whereby private citizens “take the law 
into their own hands” to provide for their own safety, and the safety of their community 
as the state is unable to maintain its monopoly on violence. Building upon this 
foundation, scholars have advanced the idea that vigilante violence is not limited to 
weak or failed states on the whole, as many states that cannot be designated as weak or 
failing experience vigilantism. More accurately, it is the unequal distribution of state 
capacity or willingness to provide safety and security for its citizens, whereby societal 
elites benefit from the strength of the state, and marginalized groups and areas suffer 
from state neglect. Geographically, these areas have been termed "brown areas" 
(O'Donnell 1993), “stateless locations” (Cooney 1997; Nivette 2014; 2016), or 
"frontier zones" (Abrahams 1998).  
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 The first paper builds upon this foundation and tests the role of perceptions of 
state legitimacy and satisfaction with state security in either increasing or decreasing 
vigilante violence in South Africa. While I find that dissatisfaction with government 
security is positively related to vigilante violence, perceptions of state illegitimacy are 
actually negatively associated with vigilante violence, which is the opposite direction 
expected. These results are consistent across multiple models. Another fundamental 
contribution of this paper is the mapping of these frontier zones, allowing for us to 
visualize these inequalities in the state’s power and legitimacy and its capacity and 
willingness to provide adequate security for its citizens.  
 While the first paper focuses explicitly on the state, and residents’ relation and 
perception of it, the second chapter focuses on the role that community characteristics 
play in vigilante violence. Neighborhood cohesion and collective efficacy have long 
been shown to reduce levels of crime and violence in communities. These reductions 
in crime and violence are understood to be the result of the role that neighborhood 
cohesion and collective efficacy play in increasing a community’s capacity to engage 
in informal social control. However, this informal social control is generally assumed 
to be non-violent. In the South African context, and in many others, informal social 
control often takes on violent forms, as in the case of vigilante violence. Testing the 
relationship between neighborhood cohesion, collective efficacy, and vigilante 
violence, I find that in South Africa, these community characteristics are positively 
associated with vigilante violence. That is, higher levels of neighborhood cohesion and 
collective efficacy result in more incidence of vigilante violence, contrary to what has 
been found elsewhere. Thus, the results from this paper offer important challenges to 
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the existing theories of cohesion and violence and illustrate the need to continually test 
theory in new and non-Western contexts. 
 While the third paper in this dissertation continues with the theme of theoretical 
development and is motivated by testing theory in non-Western contexts, it departs 
from the previous two, in that it is qualitative. In this paper, I use semi-structured in-
depth interview data and Randall Collins’ concept of forward panic to understand how 
and why incidents of vigilantism can become superfluously violent, whereby alleged 
criminals are brutally executed, and in many cases, burned alive. According to Collins, 
in order for a situation to result in violence it must overcome an emotional field of 
tension and fear that surrounds all potentially violent situations. If that tension and fear 
is not overcome, then violence will not result. Forward panic is a process by which that 
emotional field is abruptly overcome, and the tension and fear surrounding the situation 
erupts and results in extraordinary acts of violence. In this paper, I operationalize 
forward panic into its sequential stages:  the “Build up of Tension/Fear,” the “Sudden 
Resolution in favor of one side,” “Piling on,” and “Overkill.” I find that many of 
vigilante violence in Gauteng can indeed be categorized as forward panics, and that 
although Collins’s conception of forward panic focuses on the individual, the 
conditions that create the emotional potential for forward panic in an individual can be 
structural and thus create the potential for forward panic in entire groups or parts of 
communities.  
 Although there are clear limitations in some of the analyses in this dissertation, 
taken together, the analyses presented here provide some fundamental empirical and 
theoretical advances in the study of vigilante violence, as well as offering important 
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insights into the study of collective violence, social control, policing, and contentious 
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